Syria’s Economy and the Transition Paradigm by Abboud, Samer & Arslanian, Ferdinand
Syria’s Economy and
the Transition Paradigm
abboud.fm.qu  10/27/08  5:49 PM  Page 1
St Andrews Papers 
on Contemporary Syria
SERIES EDITOR, RAYMOND HINNEBUSCH
Changing Regime Discourse and Reform in Syria
Aurora Sottimano and Kjetil Selvik 
The State and the Political Economy of Reform in Syria
Raymond Hinnebusch and Soren Schmidt 
Syria and the Euro-Mediterranean Relationship
Jörg Michael Dostal and Anja Zorob
Syria’s Economy and the Transition Paradigm
Samer Abboud and Ferdinand Arslanian
abboud.fm.qu  10/27/08  5:49 PM  Page 2
Syria’s Economy and 
the Transition Paradigm
Samer Abboud
Ferdinand Arslanian 
University of St Andrews Centre for Syrian Studies
abboud.fm.qu  10/27/08  5:49 PM  Page 3
© 2009 by the University of St Andrews Centre for Syrian Studies 
Published by the University of St Andrews Centre for Syrian Studies
School of International Relations 
Fife, Scotland
UK 
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or 
transmited in any form or by any means without prior permission of the publisher.
Distributed throughout the world by 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 
1800 30th Street
Boulder, CO 80301 
USA
www.rienner.com
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data.
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
Printed and bound in the United States of America
ISBN: 978-0-9559687-0-9 
abboud.fm.qu  10/27/08  5:49 PM  Page 4
vContents
Foreword
Ray Hinnebusch 1
1 The Transition Paradigm and the Case of Syria
Samer Abboud 3
2 Growth in Transition and Syria’s Economic Performance
Ferdinand Arslanian 33
References 75
About the Authors 79

1Foreword
Raymond Hinnebusch
Syria is embarked on a transition from a state dominated to a market
economy, but does the government have a road map? Samer Abboud
suggests that transitions vary along a continuum from neo-liberal shock
therapy with full scale privatization of the public sector to the Chinese
model of marketization in which the public sector survives within a
gradually activated market economy. Syrian policy makers have referred
approvingly to the Chinese model which is compatable with the survival
and adaptation of the authoritarian regime. Abboud explains why Syria’s
path is closer to this end of the continuum and outlines the regime’s
moves toward marketization through economic liberalization. Ferdinand
Arslanian takes up the analysis with an empirical comparison of Syria
with other ex-communist transition economies meant to locate Syria’s
tangent along the continuum, in terms of the relative extent of
liberalization and the accompanying performance of the emergent
market economy. He identifies substantial deviation from both ends of
the continuum. These are explained by Syria’s special features, alluded
to by Abboud, notably hydrocarbons, a relatively low level of
industrialization and high proportion of the economy in government,
trade and other services, plus the persistence of a commercial oriented
private sector.
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The Transition Paradigm and
the Case of Syria
Samer Abboud
Introduction
In June 2005, the Syrian Ba’ath Party held its 10th Party Conference
amidst heightened US-French pressure over Syria’s role in Lebanon and
against the backdrop of a deteriorating economy.  At the conclusion of
the conference the Party put forth a series of recommendations on its
regional and domestic strategies as well as the future direction of the
economy.  One of these recommendations commits Syria to a program
of economic transition:
Issuing the social market economy according to a gradual movement
that protects the society, stressing the importance of the state’s role in the
economy according to modern models, and re-qualifying the public sector
in the strategic sectors, and strengthening the participation of the private
sector in economic activities.1
A series of policy and institutional shifts initiated since 2000
suggest that Syria has committed to initiating a structural transition
away from a centrally planned to a market oriented economy.  Much like
Russia, Eastern Europe, and many countries in Asia, including China
and Vietnam, Syria has initiated a transition away from traditional
mechanisms of economic governance dominated by the public sector to
increasingly marketized models of governance.   
According to Yarbrough and Yarbrough (1997: 469), there are
numerous countries, including over 30 in Africa alone that are currently
in some stage of transition from central planning to a free market
economy.  Emerging from the experiences of these cases is a rich
literature that has attempted to interpret, explain, predict and model the
transition experience, a literature that will be referred to here as the
Transition Paradigm.2  In social science research the term ‘transition’
has typically been employed to signify processes associated with
political and/or economic transformation.  Despite the intersection of
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political and economic processes within these transformative
circumstances, much literature – particularly within the context of
Middle East Studies3 -- remains tethered to a narrowly defined political
transition.  The hegemonic position in social science research afforded
the study of political transition typically meant that the study of
economic transition was relegated to the field of economics.  However,
in recent years the two strands of literature have begun to speak to each
other, providing fertile ground for the study of the political economy of
transition.  When speaking of the Transition Paradigm, this paper is
referring to this more contemporaneous strand of the Transition
literature that emphasizes the multiple and interdependent geopolitical,
social, cultural, ideational and institutional factors that produce and
define transition within a country.
With this in mind, the aim of this paper is to ask two very simple
questions.  First, what can the Transition Paradigm tell us about Syria’s
economic transition?  And second, what can’t the Transition Paradigm
tell us about Syria’s economic transition?  The question of how the
Syrian transition can be understood in relation to the experiences of
other countries must be framed both positively and negatively since the
particular dynamics of the Syrian experience are not sufficiently
captured by the empirical and theoretical work of the Transitologists.
While we can draw on the framework of the Transition Paradigm to help
us answer a number of important questions about the trajectory of
Syria’s economic transition, there are an equal number of questions that
emerge out of the Syrian experience that are not sufficiently addressed
by the paradigm.
Some prefatory notes on structure will prove helpful.  First, a
discussion of the concept of transition will be provided followed by a
delineation of the various models and strategies of transition.  The
taxonomy of transition suggests that different strategies are motivated by
the outcome of the marketization versus privatization debate.  The
distinction between the two strategies will be provided, demonstrating
which ‘model’ Syria’s transition clearly falls under.  Third, the primary
and secondary elements of transition will be identified and elaborated on
within the context of Syrian policy.  Primary elements are considered
those factors that shape and direct the transition process, while the
secondary elements are those specific areas of economic policy and
practice that are undergoing change in the transition.  As such, the
majority of this section will focus on the secondary elements and Syria’s
various policy reforms in each of these areas.  The paper will conclude
with an assessment of the original thesis questions.
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What is Transition?
Reflections on the political-economic trajectory of the twentieth century
reveal a series of significant transitions, for example, from capitalism to
socialism/communism.  The collapse of the Soviet Union and the
ascendance of neo-liberal economic policies throughout the world have
reflected broader trends in the global political economy towards the
hegemony of the market.  Indeed, transition to free markets has even
been heralded as constituting the ‘end of history’.  Despite the
proliferation of transition economies in the last three decades, there is a
key question yet to be sufficiently answered: what exactly is a transition
economy?
The difficulty of establishing a definition of a transition economy is
summarized by Papava (2005) who draws on a wide range of literature
written in Russian. Papava defines the ‘transitional period’ as “a period
of time during which a certain historical choice has to be made” (Ibid).
Other approaches define ‘transitional economy’ as representing the
negotiation between any two psychologically and theoretically opposed
regulatory approaches. Institutionalist perspectives argue that the
transition process is defined by the substitution, developing and
functioning of formal and informal institutions, i.e. the market in place
of the central plan.  Finally, some definitions stress the inevitability of
systemic transformation and locate transition economies within a
broader context of interminable systemic adjustment.  Definitional and
terminological ambiguities notwithstanding, there are processes,
policies, strategies and outcomes that are associated with economic
transition.
The two dominant models of economic transition that provide the
theoretical and conceptual tools for our understanding of the process
have been the neoclassical and market socialist models .4  The former is
based on the transition process in Russia and Eastern Europe, both of
which were defined by ‘shock therapy’ strategies, and the latter,
commonly referred to as the ‘gradualist’ model, was employed in
countries such as China, Vietnam, and Cuba.  A number of strategies
differentiate these two models.  First, both are grounded in different
expectations of the speed of the transition process.  Shock therapy calls
for immediate privatization over a period of a decade, while gradualism
assumes that the transition process will take many decades.  Second,
shock therapy strategies prescribe that political and economic transition
is interlinked and cannot occur independently of one another
(perestroika and glasnost).  The gradualist model, on the other hand, is
premised on the belief that a country can undergo economic transition
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without corresponding political transition (glasnost with no perestroika).
Third, in the shock therapy model the international financial institutions
(IFIs) are strategically and financially embedded in the transition
process, effectively defining it.  Therefore, the transition process is
exogenous.  In the gradualist model, however, the transition process is
endogenous, and there exists very little, if any, IFI participation.
Finally, shock therapy calls for immediate privatization while
gradualism argues for marketization, with each choice resulting in
radically different reform policies. It is hypothesized that Syria
approximates a gradualist transition to a social market economy.
Primary and Secondary Elements of Transition
The aim of the transition paradigm is to explain the process of
establishing a market economy by looking at its constituent elements
and examining what factors determine the nature of this process. This
paradigm proposes that the transition process can be looked at with
regards to primary and secondary elements.  The model lays out
elements that affect transition (primary) and elements that must be
changed in this process (secondary), thus the paradigm is an expression
of the causal relationship between these two sets of elements. The end
goal is the establishment of a market economy but there is no fixed road
for getting there; on the contrary, how this emerges is dependent on the
interaction of the primary elements. The transition model tries to explain
how the market economy emerges as the product of a new policy and
institutional matrix.
The primary elements are those which shape and direct the
transition process: speed; economic analysis; definition of a good
society; political structure; ideological structure; initial conditions
(existing economic conditions); and geopolitics.  Transition is meant to
initiate changes in the secondary elements, which are: price-
liberalization/stabilization; restructuring and privatization; institutional
structure; monetary policy and the financial system; fiscal policy;
international trade and foreign aid; social policy; and the role of the
state. The strategies, approaches and models of transition are determined
by the ways in which primary elements impact the secondary elements.
Thus, the aim of this analysis os to begin to answer what the Transition
Paradigm can teach us about Syria’s economic transition through an
examination of the progress of Syrian economic reform in the secondary
elements. The discussion of the primary elements below is intended to
demonstrate how the Transition Paradigm conceptualizes each element
within the context of market socialist transition.
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Primary Elements of Economic Transition
Speed.   
Speed is perhaps the most important primary element and varies
according to whether international or indigenous institutions drive
transition.  This refers to the time period in which transition is to be
initiated.  Under the shock therapy model privatization is pursued
vigorously and quickly within a period of around ten years while under
the market socialist model marketization is pursued over decades of
economic reform.  The choice to pursue either privatization or
marketization determines the model/approach adopted in transition
economies.  The former process refers to the transfer of income power to
property users, while the latter refers to the transfer of control power to
users.  The goals of privatization are to link the rewards of property
owners with the profit of an economic unit (Wu 1994: 19).
Alternatively, the goal of marketization is to transform economic units
from centrally planned units to autonomous units capable of making
decisions on production and exchange in response to market principles,
rather than central planning dictates.  Both processes serve to fulfill two
features lacking in centrally planned economies: privatization seeks to
increase motivational efficiency while marketization seeks to increase
allocative efficiency.  As a reform strategy, privatization is associated
with the selling-off of public sector assets, while marketization is
associated with the gradual interaction of public sector enterprises in a
market economy alongside private sector enterprises.   
The strategic model of economic transition in Syria is underpinned
by an elite and regime commitment to marketization.  While briefly
discussed earlier, marketization refers to a process in which the
allocation of public sector resources become determined by markets,
rather than by a centrally planned economy (Biesbrouck and Jackson,
1995).  It also refers to the transformation of state-owned enterprises
into market actors.  Although this is a complex, interrelated process, it
consists of four primary features: (1) market-oriented reform in the
administration and management of state-owned property and firms; (2)
diversification of state-owned enterprise assets; (3) the encouragement
of market-oriented behaviour by state-owned enterprises; and (4) the
formation of mechanisms to encourage state-owned enterprises to
compete on open markets (see Wedeman, 2003).  Other features of
marketization include a reduction in subsidies to state-owned
enterprises, price reforms and reshaping labour laws.
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Economic analysis.  
This primary element of the transition process refers to the ideological
underpinnings of economic policy in the transition process.  Under the
market socialist model, economic analysis remains nominally tethered to
socialist economic analysis.  Since market socialist countries have
remained relatively independent of IFI policy prescription, they have
been able to generate economic reforms that are compatible with
previous economic policies and institutions that had developed during
decades of central planning.  In other words, while these countries adopt
economic liberalization measures, they attempt to maintain coherency
with pre-transition policy.  The political imperative of regime survival in
countries such as Syria renders total abandonment of state control as
politically unfeasible.  Thus, in the market socialist model economic
analysis remains tethered to sustaining political structures: regime
maintenance as opposed to regime transformation.  More specific
economic analysis emerges in addressing macro- and micro-economic
reforms.   
Definition of a good society.   
There are four elements (Marangos 2003) in defining a good society: the
view of existing social reality; a view of what constitutes a good society
or the desirable end state of transition; desired changes; and the means
of initiating the desired changes.  The first element refers to socio-
economic structures produced by decades of central planning, and
recognition of how these structures facilitated economic policy.  This is
important in determining what facets of the existing system are able to
fulfill transition objectives and should thus be retained, and which
features should be restructured or eliminated. The second element that
refers to the vision of a desirable end state of transition suggests a vision
for how society and economy should be structured after the transition
process.  A view of what is a ‘good society’ is designed to filter
assessments of economic and non-economic activity in the transition
process.  The third element, desired changes, must be seen as compatible
with the transition vision of a good society.  Transition to a market
economy does not simply require the articulation of a desirable end state
but a means by which to achieve this state.  Finally, the fourth element
refers to the appropriate mechanisms employed to encourage the desired
changes.  These mechanisms must be compatible with the economic
analysis underpinning the transition process.  The Syrian government’s
definition of a good society is expressed through the guiding phrase of a
‘social market economy’: a vision that seeks to reconcile market-led
growth with social harmony and security.  Reflecting this concept and a
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broad public and elite consensus on the necessity of a gradualist
transition to a market economy, Abdel Nour (2001) has argued that the
reform process is guided not by a drive towards modernization and
privatization, but rather by the need to balance modernization and
economic growth with the guarantee of social equity and welfare.    
Political and ideological structure.5
Political structures play a critical role in determining the speed of reform
(Desai 1994).  Under the market socialist model, the imperative of
regime maintenance dictates that the transition process will be gradual
and long-term so as to maintain existing political structures.  In contrast
to shock therapy proponents who locate the firm as the most
transformative actor in the transition process, the gradualist approach
suggests that the state is the most transformative agent in the move
towards marketization (Wilson, 2007: 251).  In the former model, the
firm becomes the most important actor because it makes demands on the
state.  In this view, economic policy emerges out of the bargaining
process between capital and the state.  This of course is premised on the
idea of the existence of a democratic polity.  In the absence of
democratic participation, such as the case in Syria, the state assumes the
role of the main transformative agent in the transition process.   
In Syria, domestic debate over economic reform has been wide
since 2000.  In a EuroMeSCo paper, Ayman Abdel Nour (2001: 6)
argues, “the impetus for reform arose from internal pressures and from
elite awareness that this would be an essential step to confront rapid
change in the wider world”.  At the same time, there is a broad
consensus that reforms should be gradual and aimed at alleviating
potential socio-economic hardships generated by them.  As such, though
prominent economists have debated Syria’s options for transition, party
officials, the business community and the general public have never
realistically contemplated mass privatization as a strategy in Syria.  Such
a strategy is considered not only a recipe for certain economic collapse,
but also acquiescence to the imperatives of the Washington Consensus.
As in other market socialist transition countries, the rejection of mass
privatization is recognition that shock therapy is not the most
appropriate method to introduce a market economy (Kolodko, 1999).
Perthes (2001: 143) claims that, though reform has always been
piecemeal and driven by the needs of the moment, Syrians have begun
to enter into open and lively debates about the country’s economic
relations and the strategies needed to make transition to a market
economy successful.  An emerging trend within these debates
emphasizes not simply the necessity of reform, but the strategies of
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reform as well.  In his 2000 book al-aslah al-iqtissadi fi Suriyah
(Economic Reform in Syria), Nabil Sukkar identified three models of
economic development that Syria could follow.  The first, the ‘Asian
Tigers’ model, is criticized on the basis of its subservience to the
speculation of foreign capital.  The second, the ‘Russian model’, is
rejected as a predominantly political, versus economic, model of
development.  Despite its flaws, Sukkar identifies the ‘Chinese model’
as an appropriate strategy of economic development for Syria.
Indeed, this model has won out in debates over economic reform in
Syria.6  There has been no serious recognizable elite contemplation of
the shock therapy model.  Perthes (2001: 149) has referred to Syrian
reform strategies “system maintenance by reform,” while Heydemann
(1992) has demonstrated that Syria’s ‘selective’ economic stabilization
programs were primarily political measures aimed at strengthening the
authoritarian regime.  As such, rather than dissolve or take measures to
weaken its power, the Ba’th Party has opted to follow the strategy of
organizational adaptation adopted by the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP).  According to this strategy, the Party and its associated networks
position themselves towards the goal of increasing economic
productivity, growth and output such that they can profit from
marketization.  Shevchenko (2004) views the CCP’s organizational
adaptation as “entrepreneurial,” given that there is rent-seeking and
corruption yet party cadres accept a necessary degree of compliance
with central policies.
The underlying principle of Syrian economic reform has been an
approach developed in China; that of market socialism, in which the
government introduced market mechanisms while retaining public
ownership (Ye 1991).  This is most clearly manifest in the language and
discourse of a “social market economy” that saturates the most recent
Five Year Plan (FYP).  More importantly, however, is that the China
model of marketization initiates economic liberalization in the absence
of political liberalization, unlike the strategies pursued in the former
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe which linked the two processes.  This
model thus provides an approach for the preservation of one-party
political and economic hegemony, which is pursued by maintaining the
public sector institutions that have been developed under one-party rule.
Rather than dismantling these institutions, as is the case under the
privatization strategy, the economy is expanded to allow for private
sector activity and investment and the public sector is encouraged to
compete on liberalized markets with the private sector.  This
‘liberalization at the margins’ strategy (sometimes called dual-track
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liberalization) means that a market economy is introduced parallel to
(rather than in replacement of) the existing centrally planned economy.   
The initiation of the Syrian reform movement must thus be
understood as a process that was decidedly state-led and reflected the
conscious decisions of the Syrian leadership.  Since states such as Syria
have built their legitimacy on the decades of state-led planning prior to
reform there can never be serious consideration of mass, large-scale
overhauls of the economy.  Nevertheless, the leaderships’ decision to
initiate economic reforms is grounded in recognition of the supposed
utility of capitalist reforms to generate material wealth and economic
growth within the economy.  Since the Syrian leadership is unable to
publicly embrace capitalism – a move that would surely discredit
decades of state-led planning – they take refuge in the vague
identification of Syria as a “social market economy.”  Whereas the state
has sought to roll back many of the economic structures that were
embedded in the central planning system, it has preserved key pillars of
this system, including public sector enterprises and assets, avoiding their
privatization.  In this view, there exists mutual interdependence between
the state and the market (Mizobata, 2007: 294) such that the survival or
collapse of one directly affects that of the other.  Thus, under gradualist
models of transition authoritarian political structures are necessary to
produce economic stability, growth and development.    
However, the relationship between authoritarianism and gradualism
can produce different economic paths and outcomes.  That China serves
as a model does not guarantee that Syria’s future economic development
will mirror China’s in any significant way.  For example, in China the
public sector enterprises have demonstrated that they can be responsive
to internal managerial and production reforms and hence compete on
markets with the private sector.  Policies such as decentralization and
enterprise restructuring have also been successful in strengthening the
overall capacities of the public sector.  However, in Syria, current
reforms have not been successful in generating public sector
restructuring, despite efforts at reforming the banks and introducing new
managerial systems.  Quite simply, current reforms have not initiated
any significant public sector restructuring.  Thus, there is the very real
possibility that economic reforms could generate the type of state-
society-economy nexus that emerged in Egypt in the wake of economic
reforms initiated in the 1990s, reforms which also failed to initiate
substantial reforms of the public sector.  Jordan also serves as an
example of how authoritarian political structures were maintained and
strengthened within the context of gradualist economic reform.  There is
also the possibility that Syrian economic planners could concentrate on
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attracting investment in services and tourism at the expense of
establishing a productive industrial and manufacturing base, as has been
the case in the United Arab Emirates, especially Dubai.  This is an
interesting prospect given the flow of petrodollars from the Gulf into
these sectors in Syria.  While China, Egypt, Jordan, Dubai and Syria are
all unique cases in their own respects, they represent different strategies
and outcomes of economic reform in authoritarian states.       
Initial conditions.
Karshenas (2001: 60) points out that in the context of the Middle East
and North Africa the underlying structures of the economies, arising
from their resource endowments, past development experiences and
external economic constraints, provides the context in which to
understand gradualist reform in the region.  Economists have tended to
restrict their treatment of initial conditions under transition to the initial
economic conditions (Heybey and Murrel 1999; Popov 2000).  In
addition to economic factors, including the three above points, it is
necessary to have a more comprehensive picture inclusive of other
variables such as social structures to have a more accurate understanding
of the effects of initial conditions within a particular transition since
these factors are all embedded in the economy (Bim, 1992: 181;
McKinnon, 1995: 63).  Consequently, the speed, sequencing and model
of transition adopted in each country differs since they all initiate
transition with different and uneven factor endowments (Kornai, 1999:
164; Herr and Westphal, 1991: 323).  
One of the most important initial conditions is the initial source and
control of wealth within a transition economy.  The socio-economic
landscape of a country sheds important insight into the question of rent-
seeking within the transition context.  This is particularly relevant in
Syria’s case as its political economy has been characterized by a reliance
on oil rents since the 1970s.  This would also suggest that the gradualist
model aims to preserve or at least minimize the negative impacts of
reform on rent seeking networks that have developed since this period.
Other important factors include the existing level of industrial
development; productive economic sectors; existing trade patterns and
comparative advantages.
The most important initial condition in Syria is oil and the
consequent shaping of state-society-economy relations that developed
over decades of reliance on oil revenues.  Amongst the phenomena that
emerged under the oil period were rentierism and the lack of economic
diversification in the economy.  Oil rents also allowed the state to pursue
significant public sector expansion, protection of domestic industries,
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and a complex subsidies program that supported local development.   
The range and depth of political-economic interests that were cemented
under the umbrella of oil rents is thus an important initial condition in
Syria’s transition.  Despite the presence of oil, the importance of other
resources on initial conditions cannot be underestimated.  Syria is a
country endowed with other minerals such as phosphates and natural
gas, which complement its oil reserves.  The country also is relatively
rich in agricultural land, although mismanagement, erratic rain falls and
weather patterns, below-average yields and outdated cultivation
techniques have plagued the sector.  Syria is nevertheless a country
which enjoys a high level of agricultural self-sufficiency, especially
when compared with its neighbours.  A final initial condition worth
noting is the relatively low levels of industrialization in Syria as a
percentage of GDP.  Unlike other transition countries, Syria’s service
sector actually enjoys a larger percentage of GDP then the industrial
sector.    
Oil, agricultural self-sufficiency and low levels of industrialization
are just some of the larger initial conditions which shape transition in
Syria.  Unemployment is also a major initial condition.  With Syrian
unemployment over 20% and high birth rates, there is a major challenge
in incorporating these workers into the labour force.  Furthermore, as
unemployment increases, urbanization rates increase simultaneously
placing demands on services in urban economies.  Naturally, Syria’s
geopolitical context must be accounted for.  During Syria’s military-
political presence in Lebanon thousands of Syrian labourers worked
throughout Lebanon’s economy, but in the aftermath of Syrian
withdrawal many of these labourers returned to Syria, increasing
unemployment figures and placing further demands on the economy.
Also, the Syrian economy has had to absorb hundreds of thousands, if
not millions, of Iraqi refugees fleeing the violence and occupation of
their country.  Finally, perhaps one of the most significant initial factors
is the survival of a vibrant and creative Syrian private sector.  Despite
regime attempts since the 1960s to curtail its political and economic
power, the Syrian private sector was never decimated or brought to ruin.
Rather, the private sector, elements of which have been brought into the
regime’s fold and made beneficiaries of economic policy, can serve to
facilitate the transition process.  Furthermore, since a private sector
exists and does not need to be created, this places less demands on the
government to privatize public sector enterprises.         
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Geopolitics.   
Economists have tended to narrowly understand the non-economic
variables of transition as being an ideological shift towards democracy
and the market.  Yet, in geopolitical terms, transition often represents a
shift in external markets, trading patterns and international relations.
For example, the geopolitical change from a Soviet satellite to members
of the European Union (EU) drastically shifted the political and
economic environments in the Central and Eastern European countries
that better allowed them to benefit from the post-Cold War order
(Kolodko, 2001: 301).  The shift towards the Western bloc and the
prospects of EU membership were instrumental in lending legitimacy to
the political and economic reforms experienced during transition.  
Syria’s geopolitical context is quite unique, with the most factor  its
conflict with Israel.  Related, the Palestinian-Israeli “peace process”, of
which Syria has always played a role, has defined the regional
geopolitical context particularly since the mid-1990s.  This was
disrupted by the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq, Syria’s
neighbour.  It can be said with relative ease that Syria’s current
geopolitical context is hostile and not favourable to rapid political or
economic transformation in the country.  In this sense there are multiple
geopolitical contexts contributing to this.  First, there is not only the US-
led occupation of Iraq but also increased US threats towards Syria for its
‘interference’ in Lebanon and Iraq.  The Bush Administration has passed
sanctions against Syria and has been very vocal in its opposition to
Syria’s relations with Iran, Hamas and Hizballah.  Furthermore, this
Administration has supported Israeli military attacks against Syria’s
alleged nuclear power plant.  A second context is that of the EU’s
rejection of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) agreement with
Syria.  Originally considered as a means to buffer against US threats, the
Syrian leadership quickly came to see the EMP as a tool for the EU to
pressure Syria and advance American demands on the country.  Finally,
an equally restricting/enabling context is Syria’s sour relations with
other Arab states, particularly those aligned with the US: Egypt, Jordan
and Saudi Arabia.  That said these relations have not prevented
continued economic cooperation between these states.  In fact, as will be
discussed below, Syria is enjoying increasing trade with its Arab and
non-Arab neighbours (Turkey and Iran).
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Secondary Elements of Economic Transition
The secondary elements of transition are those areas in which we see the
emergence of a policy and institutional matrix underpinning a market
economy.  In market socialist, gradualist transition countries, there are
five measures that are associated with transition (Kumsaa and Jones,
1999: 198):
price and trade liberalization and the acceptance of the private sector as the
main engine of economic growth;
market orientation of public enterprises and the encouragement of new      
     private sector entries into the market;
relaxation of state controls over the economy and microeconomic
       restructuring;
stabilization of the economy and the enactment of liberal investment laws
to encourage the inflow of foreign investment; and
adoption of liberal agricultural policies to improve output.
With these five measures in mind, rather than focusing on the eight
secondary elements individually, this section will concentrate on the
most relevant elements that address the five measures noted above.
What follows is a discussion of the types of reforms that occur under the
market socialist model, with examples given of reforms initiated in
Syria.  This is in no way an exhaustive list of the reforms initiated in
Syria; they do, however, offer a perspective on reforms in each issue
area.
Price-Liberalization/Stabilization.
In the market socialist model, price liberalization is initially
implemented ‘at the margin’ of the economy.  China developed the dual-
track liberalization model under which plan contracts between
enterprises are preserved but frozen at existing levels and price
liberalization is implemented for production taking place outside the
planned contract.  The argument behind this strategy of price
liberalization was that it provided the means to liberalize policies
without eliminating the existing rents of economic agents (Lau, Qian
and Roland, 1997, 2000).  By design, the system preserves the existing
rents of economic agents under the planning system and thus shelters
them from liberalization while creating new rents and new economic
actors on the market track.  Price liberalization is thus Pareto-improving7
since it is achieved without creating losers.  This dual-track system can
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also reduce the disorganization effect of price liberalization (Roland and
Verdier, 1999).   
Syria initiated substantive price liberalization measures in 2004.
Prior to this, the pricing system was determined by the government
through a collection of various Ministries, economic bodies and
budgetary forces such as the Price Stabilization Fund (PSF) and other
direct and indirect subsidies.  The pricing system was intended to govern
all aspects of imports, exports, production and consumption within the
country.  Commodities were divided into three categories – essential,
basic and luxury – with prices established according to the importance
of the product to the public.  The basic premise of the policy was to
discourage consumption and luxury spending and to encourage spending
on essential and basic products, including food and clothing.   
One pillar of the pricing system was the government’s move to
relate prices to public income.  Increases in the costs of production and
subsequent rises in prices were to be matched by corresponding rises in
wages and salaries to maintain consumer purchasing power relative to
prices.  Another feature of the pricing system was the gradual
harmonization of international and neighbouring country prices to more
closely reflect domestic prices, a measure aimed at improving export
capacity.  Private sector enterprises were treated as public sector entities
through mandatory compliance with government pricing policies.
Expectedly, this lead to the rise of black market activity, tax evasion and
price distortions since real prices were impossible to calculate.  Another
feature of the pre-reform pricing policy was that prices operated on a
fixed system.  That is, because of subsidies prices of essential and basic
goods remained the same, meaning that shifts in production costs were
not reflected in the price of a product.  This encouraged a chronic sellers
market whereby the objective of production was quantity and not value
(Kornai, 1992).   
The fixity of the pricing system, tax evasion and black market
activity made determining prices impossible.  As the pricing system
weakened, its institutions such as the PSF proved incapable of fulfilling
their intended functions as the gap between wages and prices, a key
determinant of the success of the pricing system, rapidly increased.
Between 1975 and 2000 the price of consumption goods increased
approximately 7185% while minimum wages over the same period rose
only 883% (Jamil, 2001).  Between 1985 and 2000 average spending on
food increased 544% while minimum wage only increased 342%, a
200% gap between wages and basic food prices (Ibid).  Moreover, living
expenses in 2000 were 300% higher than those of 1978 while
purchasing power of minimum wage earners in 2001 was lower than in
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1987.  By 2001, 96% of all government salaries fell behind the average
living standards and 68% of those salaries do not even cover average
nourishment costs as defined by the United Nations (al-Khatib, 2001).
The huge gap between wages and prices is the context in which price
liberalization policy was implemented in Syria.
Syrian price liberalization, which has aimed to reduce distortions,
has rested on four axes: introducing incentive mechanisms through
expanding public sector autonomy; selective and gradual price
liberalization; aligning prices to domestic supply and demand; and trade
liberalization. On April 18th 2004 Decree #2908 was passed by the
government, centralizing all pricing responsibilities within the Ministry
of Economy and Trade and setting out a new approach to price policy.
In the memorandum to #2908 the government acknowledged that while
it was ceding price control to the private sector, it would remain active
in directing market mechanisms.  This has meant that current Syrian
pricing policy is based on four tracks, or four price categories.  The first
track refers to essential goods and products that are essential to fulfilling
the needs of citizens, such as breads and oil.  Goods falling under this
track will remain subsidized.  Goods falling under the second track will
be subject to a price ceiling: the government will not establish what
price goods will be sold at, rather it will determine the maximum price
at which a good can be sold.  The third track establishes an independent
pricing policy for public sector management.  Any products falling
outside the first two tracks can be priced according to managerial
decisions.  Finally, any products not falling in the first three categories
are products whose prices are determined entirely by the market.   
Despite—and in some respects because of--the liberalization
measures, prices continued to skyrocket and increasingly many goods,
even essential goods, were pushed out of the reach of purchase by
ordinary Syrians.  For instance, since 2004 the prices of average food
products have increased more than 20%.  The price of fuel rose as
subsidies decreased, and the increased price of cement drove up real
estate costs, which were already on the rise due to a number of other
factors, such as the influx of Iraqi refugees.  Problems prevalent under
the pre-reform pricing system have remained.  Tax evasion has meant
that many factories remain unregistered and outside the regulatory
control of economic policy.  Black market activity creates
disequilibrium within the economy through distorting prices at all four
tracks.  Finally, fluctuations in international prices (particularly of steel)
and currency exchange fluctuation have all negatively impacted price
liberalization policy in Syria.   
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Restructuring and Privatization.  
In Syria, restructuring and privatization within the context of transition
has meant the simultaneous development of the public, mixed and
private sectors (Polling, 1998).   In the market socialist model,
restructuring and privatization is expansive since it aims at creating new
market opportunities for existing and new actors, while under shock
therapy it is contractive because it transfers public assets to the private
sector.  Syria’s economic restructuring and the re-balancing of the
public-private axis is an endogenous process of reform that is driven by
domestic forces rather than international actors.   
Steps towards private sector restructuring include bringing the
private sector into trade negotiations and expanding the opportunities for
associational activity (previously banned).  There have also been
liberalizations of investment laws and the abolition of Economic
Security Courts (Decree #16, February 15 2004) that were seen as a
major obstacle to investment.  Relaxations on foreign exchange
measures were also meant to stimulate private sector activity and
investment and increase export capacity.  In 2002, the government
abolished the exclusive import rights of state import agencies, meaning
that the domestic private sector could now import directly from
international traders.  Also, in 2005, the Commercial Bank of Syria
announced measures to ease lending to domestic investors.  These
multiple reforms aimed at expanding the capacities of the domestic
private sector but they did not involve the transfer of public assets to the
private sector.  Generally, the Syrian private sector has not responded
warmly to the idea of investing in the public sector.  Thus, policy aims
at both expanding the opportunities for private sector activity while
targeting the public sector for restructuring.
In 2004, Law #51 allowed public sector establishments to enter into
foreign contracts.  The new law establishes how public sector
establishments can secure their capital and labour needs and sell their
assets, both domestically and abroad.  It was passed to coincide with the
implementation of the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA) on
January 1 2005.  The law was meant to streamline and simplify the
contracts system since the previous system was seen as a major
impediment to the public sector’s regional competitiveness and
efficiency.  Another important 2004 decision was to halt expansion of
the public sector.  This decision was made in conjunction with a move
towards transferring management control of public sector enterprises to
private contractors.  Under this move, the public sector would retain
ownership while the private sector would manage the enterprises.
Finally, the government authorized private investment in joint ventures
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with the public sector, a move intended to attract the necessary capital to
transform stagnant enterprises into competitive economic actors.  The
Syrian Arab Electronics Industries Company (Syronics) and the General
Organization of Tobacco (GOT) have already entered into investment
agreements with international firms.  All these measures aim at
gradually rehabilitating the public sector and attracting private capital to
increase Syria’s production and export capacities.  
Institutional Structure.
Rodrik and Subramanian (2003) identify four types of institutions that
compose the institutional structure of a market system.  First, market-
creating institutions are those that are concerned with the protection of
property rights and the enforcement of economic contracts.  The market
would either not exist or function poorly in their absence.  Second,
market-regulating institutions are those that correct market imbalances
and deal with market externalities.  Third, market-stabilizing institutions
deal with macroeconomic stability, ensuring institutional control over
inflation, financial crises and market fluctuations.  Finally, market-
legitimizing institutions are concerned with the provision of social
welfare and protection and are often involved in patterns of economic
distribution.   
Since Syria has not undergone mass privatization, there has not
been significant institutional overhaul, especially of the fourth type.
However, one of the most important measures has been the
consolidation of decision making power within existing institutions.  In
2004, along with substantial price liberalization measures, the
government centralized pricing policy within the Ministry of Economy
and Trade.  Prior to this, pricing policy was guided by a committee
consisting of representatives of the Economic Committee, the Ministry
of Supply and the Executive Bureaus in the Syrian Governorates.  There
have also been significant centralization measures within Ministries,
most notably the Ministry of Supply and Internal Trade.  Many of its
ministerial bodies were amalgamated, the rationale being to increase
management, administrative and economic capacities of the Ministry as
a whole.  This general pattern of restructuring through amalgamation
and centralization of responsibilities has characterized much of Syria’s
institutional restructuring under reform.  While many of the institutions
may not have changed, their responsibilities, capacities and inter-
relationships have been re-shaped by reforms.   
The most relevant new institution has been the revival of the Credit
and Monetary Council (CMC), a body entrusted with the formulation
and implementation of monetary policy.  In practice, the CMC will act
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as the Board of Directors for the Syrian Central Bank8 and, as stated in
Article 1 of the Law creating the Council, its objectives will be to: 1)
develop the monetary and financial market according to national
economic needs, 2) maintain the purchasing power of the Syrian
currency, 3) stabilize the foreign exchange rate of the Syrian Pound and
secure its free exchange to other currencies and 4) work towards the
growth of national income.
Monetary Policy and the Financial System.
The creation of the CMC can be seen as a response to the demands of
monetary policy, mainly to create and maintain budget constraints and
set monetary policy.  This is achieved through reform of the banking
sector, dividing its functions between a Central Bank and a number of
commercial banks.  In the market socialist model, a wholly private
financial sector is discouraged.  Reducing the potential power of private
capital is important to ensure that the state has maximum control over
the money supply and can thus assume responsibility for avoiding
inflation.  Under this model there exists a state-controlled Central Bank
and a series of state-owned commercial banks, but there is also room for
the introduction of private banking into the transition process, as long as
these banks do not interfere with the stabilizing and distributive
functions of the public sector banks.  
There is no shortage of negative characterizations of the Syrian
financial services sector that define the sector as underdeveloped, both
institutionally and structurally, and incapable of responding to the
demands of improving financial intermediation in the country.  The
State Planning Commission9, for example, lists the following
characteristics of the Syrian financial services sector: In spite of existing
foreign currency controls, approximately 80% of imports were
transacted through unlicensed currency exchange dealers. (High) interest
rates were disconnected from inflation or exchange rates. Structurally,
the public banking sector exhibited a high percentage of demand
deposits compared to total deposits and a high percentage of unclassified
debts. A high proportion of bank credits were given to the public sector
and government deficit financing through loans from the public banks
created pressures on the financial resources available for the private
sector.
According to most observers of Syria’s banking system (see Sader,
2001; Shahlawi, 2001; Shallah, 2001; Abu-Ismail, 2004; Sukkar, 2004;
Aita and Seifan, 2005), there is clearly a need for reform.  However
there were differences over how reform should proceed (Sukkar, 2004).
The debate over reform has been accurately summarized by Shallah
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(2001), who identified three schools of thought. The first school
considers public banks as important economic devices to administer the
national budget, to direct the overall economy and to finance economic
development (al-Zaim, 2001).  This school believes that the banks are
not in need of overhaul, but rather in being given special support to be
able to avoid financial crisis and assist in economic growth.  The second
school adopts a much more critical perspective of the banks in Syria and
argues that the banking system has failed in its roles and duties in the
national economy and thus should be radically reformed.  The third
school calls for the development of public sector banking operations
while simultaneously introducing private banks to operate alongside the
public sector banking system (Sukkar, 2004).  In other words, a private
banking system should be introduced but not at the expense of the public
banking system, which would be supported through necessary
institutional and structural reforms.  This third school of thought is the
dominant approach to banking reform in Syria and reflects the dual-
track liberalization of the overall banking system.   
Dual-track liberalization combines several features. Public sector
banks continue to play a dominant role in the economy and in banking
services and would not simply be marginalized by the introduction of
private banks. The official approach dismissed the idea of the
privatization of public banks and reasserted their importance in national
economic development. Hence, reforms would not deprive the public
sector banks of existing activities or set the public and private banks
against one another as rivals (Sukkar, 2004).  Indeed, the existing
reserve strength of the public sector banks and the initially low
capitalization of private banks is a situation more conducive to
cooperation than competition. Moreover, all public sector institutions
are required to continue to conduct operations with the public sector
banks, including deposits and financing. Although there is still no
strategic plan for the restructuring of the public sector banks (Sukkar,
2004), they were to be supported through the introduction of new
technologies and accounting systems.
However, the structure of the state banking system is simply
incapable of fulfilling the financial demands of the transition to a market
based economy. Realizing this, the government introduced private banks
into Syria as the cornerstone of its broader economic reform program.
Since 2001, there have been a number of laws and decrees that have
served as the pillars of Syria’s financial reforms. The most important of
these include (Horani, 2004):
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Law No. 28, April 26th, 2001 permitting the operation of private banks.
Law No. 29, April 26th, 2001, The Bank Secrecy Law.
Law No. 23, March 17th, 2002, which revived the dormant Credit and
Monetary Council, and which gave the authority for the Council to specify
interest rates and bank deposits, as well as to monitor the operation of all
banks in the country.
Decree No. 59, September 9th, 2003 to combat money laundering.
Law No. 24 and 25 (2003) aimed at balancing the taxation system and
strengthening tax collection.
Ministry of Economy and Trade decision No. 431, December 6th, 2002,
which sets aside 500 million USD annually to pay for raw materials and
imports for production.
Decisions by the Credit and Monetary Council No. 4 (May 28th, 2003), No.
39 (December 3rd, 2003) and No. 43 (January 25th, 2004) which all relate to
lowering interest rates
Decree No. 33 (2004) which cancelled decrees 6 and 24 that had outlawed
dealing in foreign currencies.
These reforms address a series of important elements of a market
monetary system.  First, they restructure the entire public banking sector
and introduce private banking into the economy.  Interest rate reform,
which was needed after more than twenty years of Syria’s banks
operating with unchanged interest rates, aimed at introducing new
mechanisms to increase competition between the banks and to attract
local capital into them.  The revival of the CMC also served to introduce
new institutions responsible for overseeing the monetary system and for
implementing monetary policy.   
The most significant of these reforms from the perspective of a
transition economy is the introduction of private banking.  Thus far the
record of private banking in Syria is difficult to construct given that
these banks have only operated since 2003.  Nevertheless, there are
certain trends that offer some perspective on what these reforms have
meant to the overall monetary system.  First, since 2003 there has been a
steady increase in the private banking sector’s total assets, while the
public sector has witnessed a decline in its assets.  Deposits in private
banks have also steadily increased since this period, while public sector
banking deposits have decreased, suggesting that Syrians are
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transferring their money to the private banks.  There has thus been a
healthy yearly increase in the private banks’ market share although this
trend should be viewed with some caution as only a minimal percentage
of deposits (less than 5%) are actually transferred to long-term savings
accounts.  Third, both the public and private sector banks have increased
their credit lending.  The positive, upward trends for the private sector
banks can be expected given that they have only recently established
operations.  A host of other reforms remain necessary, either to
formulate or implement, to expand the services and capacities of both
the public and private banking sectors, and thus to strengthen the
monetary system as a whole.  Thus, while the initial outcomes of the
reforms seem positive, the contributions of the private sector banks to
the economy as a whole remains limited, their services restricted and
their standards remain below international and even regional banking
standards.   
Fiscal Policy.
Under market socialist transition, fiscal policy is expansionary. Public
investment/spending are key fiscal measures used by the government
under market socialist transition to increase living standards and
maintain public services and benefits; tax policy and structure are the
most important determinants of fiscal policy. In Syria, the shift in fiscal
policy from deflationary to expansionary began in the 1990s to
compensate for the lack of investment flowing into the country.  In more
recent years it has been complemented by other trends such as the
reduction of interest rates and the easing of credit access.
However, by 2003, despite access to substantial oil revenues,
public spending in Syria was approximately $300 USD/person, while
neighbouring countries’ (oil and non-oil economies) figures reached
approximately $1000 USD/person (Nejmeh, 2003).  The potential for
government extraction of revenues to support growth-stimulating public
spending and investment in Syria is hampered by a series of existing
phenomenon.  First, national revenue distribution through wages and
salaries is simply insufficient to fulfill growth needs.  Jamil (2004)
estimated that salaries need to be at least three times the level they are at
now to contribute meaningfully to economic growth, hence tax
revenues. Unemployment, which is currently at approximately 20% has
a similar effect. Third, the returns on public investment, estimated at
approximately 20%, are very low.  A fourth concern is that the current
overall budget is prepared by the Ministry of Finance while the
Investment budget is prepared by the Planning Commission, with a
resulting disjuncture between national spending and investment
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objectives.  Finally, the state no longer has the resources to shoulder the
burden of public investment and must thus rely on private investment
activity to generate economic growth.
The government has long channeled oil revenues as substitutes for
an efficient and functioning tax system.  With the decline of oil
revenues, however, the priority has become improved revenue
generating mechanisms. However, the country suffers from weaknesses
in tax administration. To claim that tax evasion in Syria has caused
structural deficiencies in tax administration or that it has reached
disturbing proportions in scope would both be understatements.  Syrian
economist Samir Seifan (2001) has outlined a series of tax evasion
practices occurring throughout the economy.  Simple measures of non-
declaration or hiding economic activity are perhaps the most
economically destructive measures as Seifan claims that more than 70%
of all economic activity is hidden.  Foreign enterprises not declaring
income account for an estimated 4 billion SYP in lost taxes each year.
There are also tens of thousands of small businesses and workshops that
operate without licenses and permits, thus falling outside the taxation
system. Additionally, there is significant tax evasion, which occurs not
simply through avoidance but through active bribery and corruption of
state officials.10 Given these varied evasion measures, Seifan (2001)
estimates that private sector tax evasion equals 50 billion SYP annually,
a figure that does not accurately account for the significant black market
activity in the country.  There is a myriad of distortive economic effects
of pervasive tax evasion, including strains on state revenues, increasing
indirect taxes, strains on public investment spending, the spreading of
corruption practices, and uneven competition between public and private
sector companies. Aside from the structural distortions produced by oil
revenues and the pervasiveness of corruption, there are a series of other
targets of tax reform, including: antiquated legislation; contradictory
legislation; and a lack of tax benefits and legislative ambiguities (al-
Hussein, 2004).
Since 2004, the government has initiated a series of tax reforms
aimed at addressing these deficiencies.  For example, decree No. 61
(2004) abolished twelve consumption taxes on several products and
services and imposes a set of streamlined taxes in order to end double
taxation of industry and to give a boost to the manufacturing industry
and to exports.  Most significantly, however, were two laws passed in
2003 which were indicative of the tension between the state’s
distributive and extractive roles.  Law No. 24 (2003) significantly
reduced income tax rates and schedules on individuals and companies
and is seen as part of the state’s strategy to encourage the payment of
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taxes and to increase the purchasing power of Syrians. Its counterpart,
Law No. 25 (2003), significantly increased penalties for tax evasion,
including fines and possible prison sentences.   
The two laws – 61 and 24/25 – reflect the general government
approach to tax reform, which is based on three foundational axes:
reducing taxes on resources of income in order to stimulate production
and investment; counterbalancing this reduction by taxing income uses;
and, finally, reducing taxes on consumption spending to generate
consumer spending.  On the first two axes, a series of decrees and laws
have been passed to reduce taxation of income sources and to help
generate investment and spending.  Legislative decree #18 passed on
February 14, 2004 and cancelled both Law No. 794 (in place since
1928) and Law No. 54 (in place since 1979) and abolished livestock
taxes, instead replacing the tax with a general export fee of 100 SYP per
head.  In November 2003, Law No. 22 was passed and resulted in the
capitalization of loans for the general debt fund, a move intended to
stimulate borrowing. The third axis of tax reform intended to generate
consumer spending has been characterized by the following measures
passed through a series of decrees: cancelling fees on televisions, radios,
alcohol and cement; relaxing controls on the distribution of sugar and
salt; and cancelling agricultural production taxes (al-Hussein, 2004).  At
the time of writing, a series of other important measures were being
formulated or considered by the Ministry under a ‘financial reform plan’
intended to completely overhaul the tax system and the financial sector,
including reform of machinery tax legislation and real-estate related
taxes, especially relating to foreign ownership.   
Finally, in addition to these various reforms of the tax
administration, the government has embarked on a major step towards
increasing the revenue base through the promised introduction of a
Value Added Tax (VAT) of 10% by 2009.  The VAT will serve as a
goods and services tax and will not apply to basic food products.  In
announcing the decision, Finance Minister Mohammed al-Hussein
acknowledged that oil revenues were only expected to constitute 20% of
state income and thus measures had to be taken to substitute for the
dramatic loss of oil revenues which was around 70% of total state
income in 2000.  The introduction of the VAT is a measure aimed at
both improving tax collection and increasing state income, although its
introduction is likely in response to some of the failure of existing
reforms to increase revenues through tax collection.      
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International Trade.   
International trade is one of the key secondary elements of the transition
process and a major determinant of structural change in transition
economies.  The liberalization of foreign trade is essential to the
transition process (Sutela, 1992: 85), often forming the cornerstone of
any transition strategy.  As Tisdell (2001: 577) argues, former centrally
planned economies are confronted with two dimensions of market
forces, the creation of internal markets and the opening of national
economies to the market forces of the outside world. Trade in market
socialist transition countries poses a dual-reform dilemma.  On the one
hand, there needs to be reform of internal production practices to create
regional and international trading partners and, on the other hand, there
is the impact of international competition on internal reform.  The
interaction between domestic and international processes impacting
trade in transition countries shapes the process in multiple ways.  Thus,
under the market socialist model there is a constant tension between the
legacies of protectionism and the need for greater market expansion and
trade to generate foreign currency and enhance enterprise
competitiveness.  Trade is typically conducted on a bilateral basis in the
first periods of reform and in conjunction with the creation of trade
incentives, such as credit facilities and eliminating any barriers to
import/export that existed prior to reform.  Since under the central
planning ISI model enterprises were typically shielded from
competition, market socialist transition must gradually support the
restructuring of enterprises to compete on domestic and regional
markets.  Trade liberalization under the market socialist model thus
functions as a ‘building block’ towards greater, more integrated regional
and international trade.
In this vein, Syria has entered into a number of bilateral agreements
with neighbouring countries such as Jordan, Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Saudi
Arabia, in addition to its multilateral commitments, the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and the GAFTA.  Many observers of
Syria’s economy confirm the importance of bilateral trade agreements in
facilitating Syria’s ascension into both the EMP and GAFTA (Qalla,
2005; Suleiman, 2005; al-Amadi, 2003), claiming that Syria’s
negotiation and fulfillment of the requirements of bilateral agreements
will better prepare the economy for broader regional competition,
facilitate the passage of necessary economic laws, decrease public sector
monopolies, encourage private sector activity and attract investment.
Bilateralism is especially important in the context of the GAFTA, since
trade agreements with Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon all conformed to
GAFTA provisions.  This helped prepare domestic Syrian producers for
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regional competition prior to the opening of Syrian markets to other
Arab companies.  
Although GAFTA represents an ‘open regionalism’ model, it is by
far the most advanced project of Arab economic cooperation in modern
times.  The GAFTA forced Syria to remove its tariffs and address its
many non-tariff barriers.  Khoury (2002) has noted that the most
important aspect of GAFTA is in exposing Syrian producers to regional
competition after decades of protection under central planning.
Increased Arab cooperation also holds the possibility for expanded
regional growth and development accelerated by inter-regional trade and
investment.  For example, as a member of the new Arab trading bloc,
Syria will be more attractive for investors, as we see in the case of
investors from China, Russia and Korea, whose substantial investments
in Syria are stimulating production and export trade from within Syria’s
borders.  Another feature of the GAFTA is that Syria’s trade with Arab
countries is in non-oil products; hence GAFTA can enlarge markets for
Syrian industry and support the upgrading of production practices and
the increase of value added in Syrian production.
These features of the GAFTA contrast sharply with those of the
EMP.  First, Syria’s trade with Europe is heavily dominated by oil
products such that any liberalization of trade between the EU and Syria
would put Syrian producers at a severe disadvantage.  Second, the EMP,
unlike the GAFTA, financially supports Syrian infrastructural,
institutional and policy development through various financial schemes.
Institutions such as the Syrian-European Business Center (SEBC) or the
ISMF are entirely funded by the EU.  These institutions are active in
supporting Syria’s transition through research and publication of
relevant economy and sectoral reports.  More importantly, however,
they support the creation of linkages between EU and Syrian traders,
they support Syrian exporters in gaining knowledge of exporting
practices and standards, they contribute to government restructuring of
key Ministries and economic institutions and they offer financial support
to small businesses wishing to export products to the EU.  Institutional
development, support and financing in any capacity is entirely absent
from the GAFTA provisions.  The ‘open regionalism’ model of GAFTA
contrasts sharply with the functionalist model promoted by the EU,
which stresses the development of institutions, institutional capacities
and institutional modernization.  Thus, while the EMP does not carry
with it tangible trade benefits, the EU supports administrative and
institutional reform in Syria, aids in the introduction of new technologies
and practices into various Ministries and institutions, and provides
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relevant information on the domestic, EU and world economy,
facilitating trade between Syria and the EU.
Conclusion
The Transition Paradigm helps us understand the emergence of a policy
and institutional matrix in Syria that underpins the emerging market
economy.  Since Syria has not followed a transition that is grounded in
theoretically-derived policies, specifically the prescriptions of neo-
liberalism, but is a more pragmatic, even ad-hoc respond to its special
conditions, the Transition Paradigm helps us understand the logic behind
the government’s approach to economic reform and transition.  It can
thus help us answer questions such as: why has the reform process been
so slow?  Do certain policies, seemingly inconsistent in the perspective
of conventional economics, have their own logic? What the Transition
Paradigm tells us is that the transition process in Syria will be, by
definition, slow and disjointed, strong in some areas and weak in others,
simultaneously economically painful and painless, and of course, long.
Ultimately, the Transition Paradigm can help us think about why
policies and institutions are erected, and how these matrices create and
sustain or obstruct a market economy.
Yet, while the Transition Paradigm can answer important questions
regarding the nature, scope and rationale of reform and the policy-
institutional matrix of a market economy, there are a number of issues
that the Paradigm ignores that must be included in any understanding of
the process of economic transition in Syria.  The Paradigm is rather
state-centric in its approach as it sees the state as the transformative
agent within the transition process.  Thus, our understanding of
transition must look beyond merely the state as a unit of analysis to help
explain and interpret the transition process.  
In the late 1990s a growing literature on the ‘Varieties of
Capitalism’ (Hall and Soskice 2001; Amable 2003) emerged that sought
to account for the trajectory of different versions of capitalism in
advanced economies and other transition economies throughout the
world.  The approach is actor-centered and sees the domestic political-
economy landscape as populated by multiple and pluralistic actors.
These actors include individuals, firms, government officials, networks
and producers/industrialists.  In this literature, actors interact with each
other through various institutional modes, they are the key agents of
adjustment and it is their activities that determine the different levels of
economic performance and growth.  This approach helps us overcome
the state-centric logic of the Transition Paradigm that concentrates on
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the state as the transformative agent in the transition process.  This
literature begins to tell us about what the future of transition in Syria
may look like, how a market economy may or may not develop, and
what long-term challenges Syria faces.  Most importantly, this literature
tells us about how non-state as well as state actors operate within the
policy and institutional matrix of a market economy, something which
the Transition Paradigm generally ignores.   
This ultimately is a question of governance that the Paradigm
overlooks.  While it can help us understand the emergence of a market
economy through the creation of policy and institutions, it is less useful
in helping us understand how economic actors operate within, and
indeed outside, this matrix, and in turn what impact this has on the
prospects of transition to a market economy.  Simply put, economic
reforms will be ineffective if economic actors do not mobilize within the
emerging matrix to make the reforms successful and durable.   The act
of establishing capitalist legal structures does not guarantee their
operation according to market precepts. For example, Syria has
witnessed a significant spike in foreign investment in recent years but
this has not been the result of liberalized investment or trade laws.
Rather, increased investment has primarily flowed from the Gulf
countries which are enjoying excess liquidity in the wake of the boom in
oil prices and investing heavily in the services and tourism sectors.
There is not much evidence to suggest that reform measures have
actually initiated large-scale productive investment in industry and
agriculture.
Furthermore, the role of class is ignored in the Paradigm.  Linda
Fuller has noted that in the transition literature, the previous ‘mass’ has
been superseded by an equally homogeneous ‘public’ or ‘citizens’.  This
homogenizing language serves to alienate any class analysis from the
discussion of transition economies, especially in the market socialist
context that views the state as the transformative agent in the transition
process.  However, in the transition period, Lane (2005: 421) has argued
that the rise of classes is stimulated by marketization and the
replacement of administratively determined incomes by market-oriented
ones.  A class analysis of transition can thus help explain the forces
underlying the tug of war in the transition process, and it can help us
better understand the processes of economic dislocation and
marginalization that are revealed in the context of transition.  Again, the
Transition Paradigm ignores the potentially transformative role of class
within the context of economic transition.  Growing class inequalities in
Syria generated by inflationary and price fluctuations, high
unemployment, wage stagnation and increasing costs of living, mean
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that class issues will shape the future trajectory of the domestic political
economy as it undergoes transition.
Nevertheless, the Paradigm offers a wealth of theoretical and
conceptual tools from which to understand the process of economic
transition in Syria.  This paper has attempted to introduce these tools and
in doing so has established a broad approach to help encourage
understanding, debate and negotiation of the process of transition in
Syria.  Drawing on the experiences of transition countries throughout
Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America, the Paradigm can not only help
us understand the specificities of Syria’s transition, but it also allows us
to view Syria’s transition comparatively.
                                                      
1 Ba’th Party recommendations published in Al-Ba’ath newspaper, June 13
2005.
2 Others have used the term ‘transitology’ to refer to the study of
transitions.
3 See Brownlee (2005: 45-48) and Perthes, Volker (ed.) (2004) Arab Elites:
Negotiating the Politics of Change.
4 A third strategy, associated with the transition process in the Balkans, is
referred to as the ‘Third Road,’ or ‘Gradual Gradualism,’ which refers to market
transition as a long, tedious process, where privatization is restricted to small
enterprises, and private ownership is permitted only in trade, services and
tourism (Berend, 1995: 133-137)
5 Considering that political and ideological structures are interconnected
elements, to avoid repetition the discussion of the two elements has been
merged.
6 See several documents prepared by the State Planning Commission in
both English and Arabic. The most relevant in demonstrating the Syrian
commitment to dual-track liberalization are Highlights of the Syrian Economy
and the Tenth 5YP Strategy (2006), The Management of Economic Planning in
Syria (2006), and The Framework for Financial Sector Reform in Syria (2006).
See all the Institutional and Sector Modernisation Facility’s numerous
publications and reports on the Syrian economy.
7 Pareto-improving liberalization refers to policy that does not eliminate
benefits for some economic actors while granting economic benefits to others. It
attempts to create ‘winners’ without creating ‘losers’.
8 Article 51 of Law 23 (2002) creating the CMC states that “the Syrian
Central Bank is a public institution with financial and administrative autonomy
in charge of implementing monetary policy to be determined by the Monetary
and Credit Council, operating under the auspices of the State within the general
orientations of the economy policy adopted by the Council of Ministers.”
9 See document entitled ‘The Framework for Financial Sector Reform in
Syria’ (2006) published by the State Planning Commission.
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10 Based on a survey of Syrian businesses, the World Bank (2005: 31) has
determined that 70% of firm interactions with tax inspectors involve informal
payments.

33
2
Growth in Transition and Syria’s
Economic Performance
Ferdinand Arslanian
Introduction
This paper attempts to analyze Syria’s economic performance within the
framework of a transition economy where economic performance is
determined through the interaction of the country’s initial conditions at
the outset of transition with its liberalization measures and
macroeconomic stabilization policies rather than by traditional supply
side factor inputs such as capital and labor. It must be acknowledged
that it is somewhat problematic to refer to Syria as a “planned
economy”, and, consequently, its subsequent gradual economic
liberalization as a “transition economy”. Perthes (1992), for example,
was cautious in labeling Syria a “planned economy” “as the plans lacked
virtually any compulsory force’ (Perthes 1992: 45). Hinnebusch (1995)
viewed Syria’s economic policy as more neo-mercantilist than state
capitalist, aimed at state formation through external rents rather than
seeking to maximize capital accumulation. This aspect questions the
whole rationality of applying a transition model developed by reference
to the transition experience of the central planning economies of the
socialist bloc to Syria’s creeping economic liberalization.
On the other hand, it could be argued that central planning
economies are highly heterogonous among themselves; with the main
difference being between East Asian and European countries, and within
European Countries between the former Soviet Union and Eastern
European Countries. Therefore, by comparing and contrasting Syria’s
economic performance with that of other transition countries, and by
classifying Syria’s economy among the different categories of transition
countries with regards to its initial conditions, reform strategy and
performance, the relevance of the transition model as an analytical tool
for the Syrian economy, in addition to its special features, could be
identified. Furthermore, the analysis will identify where Syria currently
stands in its process of transition to a market economy and,
consequently, what lies ahead for the country. Therefore, by considering
Syria’s foreign exchange crisis in 1986 and its subsequent reform
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policies as a starting point for Syria’s transition into a market economy,
this paper finds that the transition model is quite relevant for explaining
Syria’s economic performance. Syria can be categorized as an
underdeveloped resource abundant transition country, and therefore
initially enjoyed a fast recovery, and consequently delayed reforms and
was locked in a staple trap1. And now with the gradual decline of its oil
reserves, the Syrian economy is being exposed to its accumulated
weaknesses, suffering from low adminsitrative capacity to implement
reforms, a weak industrial base and a constrained business environment.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview
of the Syrian economy during its central planning years up to the foreign
exchange crisis in 1986. In section 3 an analysis of Syria’s initial
conditions in comparison with other transition countries will be carried
out after explaining the impact of initial conditions on liberalization and
economic performance according to de Melo et al (1997). The years
from 1986 onwards are sub-divided into three periods based on their
distinct characteristics in terms of structural reforms and performance.
Therefore, section 4 examines the austerity years of (1986-1990), while
section 5 illustrates the decade of economic pluralism in the nineties.
Finally, section 6 attempts to outline the developments of the period
from 2000 onwards.
Central Planning in Syria
The first glimpse of central planning in Syria took place during Syria’s
union with Egypt in 1958, with land redistribution, bank nationalization
and an increase in the role of the state taking place. Later on in the
1960s and with the rise of the Ba’th party to power, more radical
reforms were undertaken with a series of nationalizations of private
firms and a bigger role for the state in production, redistribution and
consumption. The period 1966-1970 witnessed an attempt to launch a
huge program of public investment and to expand the manufacturing
sector. However, this attempt was curtailed by the lack of domestic
financial resources due to the flight of private capital and the erratic
performance of public industrial enterprises. Public investments
concentrated on two mega projects (the Euphrates dam and initiating
petroleum production) that absorbed the majority of public resources,
leading to increases in inflation rates and foreign debt and causing
bottlenecks in the supply of many goods.    
However, this ambitious program of public investment began to
materialize in the 70s with the flow of external funds from various
sources: Arab aid, oil exports, remittances and transit revenue, in
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addition to the availability of cheap credit in the international market.
Investments were projected in industry and infrastructure such as dams
and power stations. Development in the form of electricity, roads and
schools was noticeable in all parts of the country. Public industry was
based on consumer-oriented import substitution industrialization (ISI)
which was highly dependent on advanced imported technology, raw
material and spare parts (Perthes 1992, pp. 40). Furthermore, the
implementation of this massive investment program resulted in the
enlargement in the size of the government and its administrative
institutions. On the other hand, the early seventies witnessed the revival
of the private sector. However, this new private sector was highly
marginalized, acting as a sub-contractor to the large state sector and
specializing in peripheral activities such as construction, real estate
speculation and exports-imports operations. Overall, during the
seventies - as argued by Hinnebusch (1995) - the state controlled the
heights of the economy while the private sector was confined to the
periphery.   
However, many problems became apparent with import
substitution industrialization, with many plants not going into operation
upon completion due to the lack of local expertise (Perthes 1992, pp.
40). Moreover, ISI led to an increase in imports of intermediate goods,
increasing the pressure on the countries’ balance of payments.
Furthermore, the over-centralization (the lack of operational authority
for plant managers) and politicization (achieving maximum
employment, political appointments) of public plants deprived them of
dynamism, resulting in weak financial performance and rendering them
unable to generate sufficient surpluses for financing major investments
(Hinnebusch 1995, pp. 309). Nevertheless, the lack of profitability of the
public sector neither deterred its expansion nor induced its
reconstruction. The public sector was sustained with the facilitation of
abundant external rents, and the state bureaucracy and army kept on
expanding, creating a state too large for its economic base. And with the
decline in Arab aid, oil prices and remittances in the eighties, the crisis
in the Syrian economy began to materialize. The increase in the import
of capital goods and spare parts induced by ISI, in addition to the
increase in the import of agricultural food imports all contributed to the
widening of the balance of payments deficit and the increase in foreign
debt leading to a foreign exchange crisis in 1986 which would bring on
many reform measures and could be considered as the starting year of
transition in our analysis.    
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Figure 2.1 Syria's Average Annual GDP Growth Rates (%) 
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The crisis was most obvious in the declining growth rates of Syrian
GDP throughout the second half of the 70s and the first half of the 80s
(figure 2.1). Thus, while the average annual growth rates in the first half
of the 70s reached 14%, they declined to around 5% in the second half
and then again to 2.6% in the first half of the 80s.    
The main difference in Syria’s central planning experience in
comparison with the standard central planning economy (CPE) lies in
the following: CPEs were successful in their early years in achieving
high growth rates due to their successful accumulation of factor inputs,
capital and labor. They were successful at mobilizing rural labor
surpluses from agriculture into industry, and at achieving high domestic
savings rates and allocating them into productive investment. And with
the exhaustion of rural labor surplus and the limitations on increasing
the investment ratio, CPE growth declined due to the failure of
increasing total factor productivity. On the other hand, the public sector
in Syria, from the very beginning, had failed to become “an engine of
capital accumulation” (Hinnebusch 1995, pp. 309) and its high
investment and expenditure levels relied on external sources rather than
on domestic savings. Therefore, with the decline of these sources,
growth rates plummeted even before the exhaustion of rural labor
surplus. In other words, in Syria “the economic logic of accumulation
was subordinated to the logic of state formation” (Hinnebusch 1995, pp.
311) leading to the overdevelopment of the state without having a
profound industrial base to maintain it. Therefore, while CPEs have
been successful in changing the structure of their economies from a rural
based economy to an industrial one, Syria’s economic structure
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remained highly stagnant with a slight increase in industry, due to oil
production, and in services, due to the increase in government services.              
Table 2.1 Structure of GDP in Market Prices by Sector
(at constant prices of 1985)
1963 1970 1975 1980 1985
Agriculture 35 24 22 25 21
Industry 15 22 22 20 22
Services 50 54 56 55 57
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics (1990)
Initial Conditions
De Melo et al (1997) identify 11 variables that characterize the initial
conditions of transition economies in their shift towards market oriented
development. These indicators are clustered into two groups. The first
group (PRIN1) represents the degree of macroeconomic distortions
which is based on the degree of trade dependency, repressed inflation
and black market premium. These distortions are assumed to be
translated into shocks to the economy as liberalization takes place and
therefore measure the intensity of transitory shocks.2 Also included is
the extent of familiarity of market processes and experience as a
coherent nation-state, counterbalancing factors that measure the likely
capacity of a state to deal with distortions. The second group (PRIN2)
represents the overall level of development, with countries ranking high
on this index tending to have a higher per capita income and a higher
share of urban population and suffering from over-industrialization,
diminishing returns to investment and low pre-reform growth rates.
Plotting transition countries against these two groups, four broad
clusters emerge, indicated in table 3.1. It should be noted that initial
conditions, along with other variables, have their influence on
performance through two channels; 1) directly and 2) indirectly through
its impact on liberalization. The links between initial conditions, policy
Table 3.1 Classifying Transition Countries According to their Initial
Conditions
Clusters Countries Level of
Development
Macroeconomic
Distortions
1 Baltic States- Russia –
Caucasus
High High
2 East European Coun-
tries
High Low
3 Central Asian States Low High
4 China-Vietnam-Albania Low Low
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reform choices given by the liberalization indices,3 and performance
outcomes measured in terms of growth and inflation, have been
identified through the following system of equations; where “i”
represents country and “t” represents year:4
LIBit = a + bo LIB it-1 + b1 PRIN1i + b2 PRIN2i + b3 FREEDOMit + b4
RTit + e (1)
PERFORMANCEit = z + y0 PRIN1i + y1 PRIN2i + y2 LIBit +y3 LIB it-1
+ y4 RT it + e (2)
Beginning with the performance equation, the model predicts,
based on previous empirical results,“that good performance (high
growth, low inflation) depends negatively on the size of the
contemporaneous liberalization step (LIB) but positively on the
accumulated stock of reforms (LIB-1)”, and therefore  y2 < 0 , y3 > 0.
Regarding initial conditions, the model predicts that both
macroeconomic distortions (PRIN1) and the level of development
(PRIN2) –capturing structural distortions such as overindustrialization -
have negative effects on performance (y0 < 0, y1 < 0). The model
predicts a negative relation between the level of macroeconomic
distortions (PRIN1) and the degree of liberalization, (b1 < 0), consistant
with the behavior of output smoothing since both PRIN1 and
contemporaneous liberalization have a negative impact on performance.
On the other hand, it is expected that the PRIN2 is positively correlated
with the degree of liberalization, (b2 > 0), since countries with higher
levels of development have greater administrative capacity to implement
reform and a greater capacity to absorb negative shocks.  The model also
addresses regional tensions (RT) and political freedom (FREEDOM)
where it assumes that higher regional tension and the absence of
political freedom will both have a negative impact on performance and
liberalization (b3 < 0, y3 < 0, b4 > 0, y4>0). The model explains why
East European Countries (the second cluster) exhibiting a high degree of
over-industrialization and modest economic distortions will liberalize
and recover faster than countries in the first cluster (Russia and the
Baltics) or than Central Asian countries in the third cluster. Moreover, it
explains why the two East Asian countries in cluster 4, with low level of
development and limited economic distortions, can grow fast despite
pursuing a gradual reform strategy.       
Below the analysis will address Syria’s initial conditions in
comparison with other transition countries and try to identify where
Syria is positioned among these clusters and accordingly attempt to
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predict the impact of its initial conditions on its transition strategy as
illustrated by de Melo et al (1997).    
Overall level of development
Income levels5 (PPP in base years)6
Examining figure 3.1, we note that transition countries varied widely in
their per capita income at the outset of transition, from Slovenia (9200$)
Figure 3.1 Initial Per Capita GNP at PPP US$ 
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to China (800$). In comparison with other transition economies, Syria’s
initial per capita income, at (1382 US$), is considered very low, ranking
third among the lower end of transition countries, only exceeding the
levels of East Asian countries (China 800 US$ – Vietnam 1100 US$),
and slightly lower than Albania’s per capita income (1400 US$).      
Urbanization
The percentage of urban population also varies widely among different
transition countries, with Russia having the highest percentage of urban
population (74% of the total population) and Asian countries having the
lowest percentage with less than 20% of their population being urban
(figure 3.2). In the case of Syria, its urban population constituted 49% of
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Figure 3.2 Urbanization (%of Population) 
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total population, the ninth least urbanized country in our set of transition
economies, and slightly lower than the transition economies’ average
(54%).
Since urbanization also acts as a proxy for the level of
development, its cross-country distribution is supposed to closely mirror
that of income levels as argued by De Melo et al (1997) with lower
income countries being on average more rural.  Although this argument
applies for Syria, its urbanization level is somehow high in comparison
with its income level. Thus, while Syria’s income level is comparable
with that of Albania and Vietnam and lower than all Central Asian
countries’ income levels, its share of urban population surpasses the
share of Asian countries, Albania and most of the Central Asian
countries (only Kazakhstan has a higher urban percentage of the
population at 57%)                
Industrialization
Industrialization is another indicator that proxies for the level of
development. A common feature of socialist countries was
overindustrializtion, as the share of industry in GDP was high because
services were typically repressed. Nevertheless, Syria’s GDP structure,
at the eve of reform, was quite contrary to the typical socialist country,
as it had the lowest share of industry in GDP and one of the highest
shares of services among transition countries (figures 3.3 and 3.4).
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Figure 3.3 Industry (%of GDP)  
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Figure 3.4 Services (%of GDP) 
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Richness of natural resources
Originally natural resource abundance was viewed as a facilitator of
transition by preventing the negative terms of trade shock associated
with energy importers after the breaking up of the CMEA system (de
Melo et al 1997, pp. 11). Later on, more emphasis was directed towards
the effects of resource abundance on delaying reforms, feeding
corruption and retarding economic diversification (Auty 1999). Turning
to Syria, it was moderately rich in natural resources, possessing 0.53
hectares per capita cropland in 1986, and reasonable gas and oil
reserves, in addition to minerals like phosphates.    
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Prior economic growth rates
Based on the observance that growth in CPEs tends to be higher at their
earlier stages, mature countries were likely to experience stagnation,
whereas poorer countries were still expected to benefit from higher
growth (de Melo et al 1997, pp. 12).  However, the logic above is not
Figure 3.5 Prior Economic Growth Rates
Five years average growth rates prior to transition 
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
C
hi
na
M
ol
do
va
 
M
on
go
lia
Be
la
ru
s
Ky
rg
yz
st
an
  
Vi
et
na
m
Tu
rk
m
en
is
t
Ka
za
kh
st
an
U
zb
ek
is
ta
n
Al
ba
ni
a
La
tv
ia
   
R
us
si
a
Li
th
ua
ni
a
Po
la
nd
Ar
m
en
ia
  
Bu
lg
ar
ia
Es
to
ni
a 
 
Sy
ria
G
eo
rg
ia
  
U
kr
ai
ne
Ta
jik
is
ta
n 
C
ze
ch
R
ep
ub
lic
H
un
ga
ry
Sl
ov
ak
R
ep
ub
lic
Az
er
ba
ija
n
C
ro
at
ia
FY
R
M
ac
ed
on
oa
Sl
ov
en
ia
R
om
an
ia
Av
er
ag
e
Source: de Melo et al (1997), Central Bureau of Statistics (1987)
relevant for Syria- a poor country- since its prior economic growth rates
(2.7% on a five year average) lag behind its comparators with low
income levels (China 9%, Mongolia 5.4%, Vietnam 5%, Uzbekistan
3.9%, and Albania 3.6%).  Furthermore, by taking a four years average
(1982-1985) growth rate, instead of a five years average (1981-1985),
Syria will have an even lower prior economic growth rate at only 1%.
Therefore, it seems as if Syria’s growth capacity under central planning
has reached its limitations in spite of its low level of development.      
Conclusion
On the eve of transition, Syria was highly underdeveloped with a very
low level of per capita income and industrialization, only comparable
with East Asian transition countries. On the other hand, there were many
features that were quite contrary to a country with a low level of
development. Syria’s higher than expected share of urban population, its
economy dominated by services and suffering from low growth rates, all
come in contrast with a typical poor socialist country. If anything, Syria
was showing signs of early maturity relative to the length of its central
planning years.           
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Level of Macro-economic Distortion
As Syria’s transition was sparked by a foreign exchange crisis, the
economy was suffering from quite severe macroeconomic imbalances,7
with both fiscal deficit and foreign debt exceeding 20% of GDP.
Nevertheless, Syria’s black market exchange rate premium of 282
(figure 3.2), although considered high by international standards, was
still below the average rate of transition countries (469). Moreover,
Syria (figure 3.7) was highly trade dependant (28% of GDP comparing
with an average of 19.7% for transition countries) and integrated with
the CMEA system (46% of overall exports and 20% of overall imports)
at the outset of reform, making it highly vulnerable to a large external
shock associated with the breakdown of CMEA trade (figures 3.8 and
3.9)   
 Figure 3.6 Black Market Exchange Rate Premium 
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Figure 3.7 Trade Dependence (%of GDP) 
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Source: Central Bureau of Statistics (1987)
Syria’s geographic location is problematic. Whereas Syria is in a good
location to serve the large markets of Europe and the oil-rich Arab countries,
regional instability constrains its ability to exploit its geographical advantage.
Furthermore, at the time of its transition, oil-rich Arab countries were suffering
from declining oil prices while European countries where nowhere near achieving
the high growth rates that East Asian countries were enjoying and which benefited
China and Vietnam.
Institutional characteristics (Stateness, Market Memory):
With regards to the initial institutional characteristics of transition
economies, two variables capture these effects: stateness and market
memory. Syria was an independent state prior to transition and,
therefore, did not need to establish new national and economic
institutions during the economic challenges of transition, by contrast
with former Yugoslav or former Soviet republics.
Assuming that central planning began in Syria in 1963, Syria had
experienced 23 years under central planning (figure 3.10), a very short
period in comparison with other transition countries with only Vietnam
spending a shorter period (21 years). As such, Syria enjoys a stronger
memory of market oriented systems. Furthermore, as in Vietnam, a
substantial - although marginalised - private sector continued to exist in
industrial production and in some services sectors. And despite public
control over production and distribution of agricultural products,
agricultural production was dominated by medium and small-sized
farmers since agrarian reform had never led to collectivisation, and had
resulted instead in the disappearance of traditional large-scale
landowners and the fragmentation of their property.    
Figure 3.8 Distrubtion of Syrian Exports by  
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Figure 3.9 Distribution of Syrian Imports by 
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Figure 3.10 Years under Central Planning 
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Therefore, based on the De Melo et al (1997) criteria, Syria
enjoyed favorable initial institutional characteristics being an
independent state prior to reform, spending a short period under central
planning and maintaining a significant private sector. However, if
measures of the quality of government are to be included such as
indexes for corruption and democratization, or tax collection ability,
Syria’s initial institutional characteristics would seem less favorable.
Overall, it is quite clear that Syria has a low level of development
making it belong to either cluster 3 or cluster 4. It is unclear, however,
whether Syria is positioned within cluster 3 or 4 as its macro distortion
is moderately high while its institutional characteristics are favorable.
However, it is safe to assume that Syria was less distorted than Central
Asian countries and more distorted than East Asian countries, placing it
somewhere close to the borders of the two clusters Table 3.2).
Table 3.2 Syria’s Set of Initial Conditions in Comparison with Clusters 3 & 4 as Identified by de
Melo et al (1997)
Syria Cluster 4 Cluster 3
Overall level of development
Income levels (PPP in base years) Low Low Low
Urbanization Low Low Low
Industrialization Low Low Low
Richness of natural resources Rich Rich Rich
Prior economic growth rates Low High High
Level of macroeconomic distortions
Repressed inflation/fiscal deficit High Low High
Trade shares in GDP High Low High
Black market exchange rate premium Medium Low High
Location proximity to thriving markets Medium Good Poor
Institutional Characteristics
State Independent Independent New nation
Market memory High High Low
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Applying the model mentioned above to Syria shows (table 3.3)
that, with exception of its high initial accumulated stock of reform, all
other factors will negatively affect the pace of liberalization and
therefore Syria is more likely to adopt a policy of gradual reform.
Table 3.3 Predicting the Impact of Different Factors on Syria’s Pace of Liberalization  and Economic
Performance according to de Melo et al (1997)
Effect on the Pace of Liberalization Effect on Performance
High macro distortions - High macro distortions -
Low level of development - Low level of development +
High initial accumulated stock of reform +
Absence of political freedom -
Low degree of contemporaneous liberali-
zation +
High accumulated stock of reform
+
High regional tensions - High regional tensions -
On the other hand, it is hard to predict the final outcome of Syria’s
performance since it is not clear whether the negative factors (macro
distortions and regional tension) will outweigh the positive factors (low
level of development and the combination of high accumulated stock of
reform with a low degree of contemporaneous liberalization). The
following chapters will show how well the model and other stylized
facts of growth in transition fit in with the case of Syria.
The Austerity Years 1986-1990
Liberalization measures
The reforms taken by the Syrian government had a rather tentative
nature as there had been no clear commitment to switch to a market
economy. These reforms aimed at coping with the fiscal and financial
crisis rather than implementing a comprehensive transition strategy;
despite that, the results ‘tended to create a more liberal and capital
oriented economy’ (Perthes 1992, pp. 43).   
Therefore, the nature of the crisis, as a fiscal and financial one,
shaped the applied liberalization measures. On one hand, the fiscal
crisis, as noted by Hinnebusch (1995), forced the regime to reduce its
economic responsibilities and seek a private sector alternative, setting its
eyes on mobilizing the enormous expatriate and hidden local capital. On
the other hand, the foreign exchange crisis encouraged export promotion
and opened international trade to the private sector. Several reforms
were characteristic of this period.
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Fiscal Austerity: The austere public policy that the government
began to implement in 1981 intensified and the budget declined from
around 50% of GDP in 1985 to nearly 30% in 1987. The curtailing of
government expenditure was achieved through implementing a harsh
wage policy, introducing cuts in public subsidies and bringing the
expansion of public enterprises to a halt.      
Liberalization of Agriculture: With the aim of reducing public
expenditure and increasing agricultural production, the Syrian
government started to gradually reform its agricultural policy, switching
from central to indicative planning. Compulsory delivery of major crops
to public sector organizations was relaxed in 1987, and prices - based on
an estimate of production costs plus a profit margin - were introduced as
a tool for delivering crops. Starting from 1988, subsidies for agricultural
inputs such as jute bags, seeds and chemical fertilizers were gradually
eliminated.  Moreover, restrictions on private sector agricultural exports
were relaxed and public-private joint ventures of agricultural companies
were encouraged. And by 1990, compulsory deliveries for major
agricultural products had been abolished while foreign trade had been
liberated regarding the export of vegetables, fruits, chickens, eggs and
natural juice. Furthermore, the private sector assumed a greater role in
the production, distribution and export of agricultural products.
However, the gradual reduction of subsidies for farm inputs was
matched by a greater increase in the prices of farm products.   
Opening investment and foreign trade to the private sector: The
government first promoted private investment in tourism and agriculture
(Law no. 10 /1986), using tax exemptions and trade facilitations. It also
revoked a ban imposed on the private sector’s participation in certain
industries formerly reserved for the public sector (Decree of the
Ministry of Industry in 1987). Moreover, the government gradually
began to abandon its monopolies on foreign trade. The private sector
was allowed to import a set of goods using export revenues, with a share
of these revenues being delivered to the Commercial Bank of Syria at an
official rate, while for another set of goods, the private sector was
allowed to import on the basis of the so-called “credit facilities”, which
in practice meant that the public sector did not deliver the necessary
currencies for imports which importers had to find by their own covert
means (Economic Research Forum 2006, pp. 59). These measures
encouraged fictive exports8 and implicitly recognized the informal
exchange rate market. Most importantly, the authorities made a barter
deal (1988- 1990) with the Soviet-Union in order to repay its debts.
Within this deal, the private sector was encouraged to export all kinds of
goods. On the other hand, the foreign exchange system became even
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more complex with the introduction of multiple exchange rates in
foreign trade and the development of several regimes of importing
procedure depending on the goods involved (Economic Research Forum
2006, pp. 59).
Performance
GDP path:
The clearest differences in the performance of transition countries are
between the countries of East Asia, China and Vietnam, and the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union.
All CEE and FSU countries experienced initial output decline and most
have experienced hyperinflation. In contrast, China and Vietnam did not
experience any initial output decline and benefited from continuous high
growth rates. Moreover, East Asian countries have been successful in
containing inflation. This initial output decline in non-Asian transition
countries and the recovery afterwards is considered one of the most
defined stylized facts of transition, and is usually termed as the U shape
curve.    
Figure 4.1 GDP Path in Transition Time 
(pre-transition year = 100) 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Transition Year 
CEE
FSU 
Vietnam
Syria 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics (1993), Arkadie and Mallon (2003), World Development
Indicators (2003)
The question to be asked is whether Syria’s initial output
performance is closer to that of CEE and FSU countries or Asian
countries. Has Syria experienced the U shape curve? Or has it
experienced continuous high growth rates? The question is quite
interesting since Syria had a low level of development comparable with
that of Asian countries and also a similar high market memory. On the
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other hand, Syria had experienced more severe initial macro-imbalances
compared with the two Asian Transition economies.
Based on Syria’s output performance of the first five years after
reform (1986-1990), as in figure 4.1, we notice that instead of both the
conventional U shape curve of CEE and FSU countries and the
continuous high growth rates of Asian countries, Syria experienced quite
a non-conventional W shape curve with output declining only in the first
year (1986), and recovering its 1985 level in the third year (1988), while
collapsing again in the fourth year (1989) – although not lower than its
1985 level - and rising again in fifth year (1990). In comparison with
other transition countries, Syria had the lowest cumulative output
decline of 4.95% of pre-transition GDP (figure 4.2).    
Figure 4.2 Cumulative Output Decline to Lowest Level
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Gross Fixed Capital Formation:
Syria’s gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP plummeted
from 24% in 1985 to reach its lowest level at 14% of GDP in 1988 only
to rise again to around in 16% of GDP in 1989 and 1990. Most
importantly, the austerity years witnessed a clear change in the
contribution of the public and private sectors to gross fixed capital
formation in favor of the private sector. The contribution of the public
sector saw a continuous decline from around 16% of GDP in 1985 to
around 7% of GDP in 1990. The share of the private sector, in absolute
terms, did not change significantly throughout the period (8% of GDP in
1985 to 9% in 1990) despite a sharp decrease to 5% of GDP in 1988.
However, in relative terms, there was a significant increase in the share
of the private sector in gross fixed capital formation, from 34% in 1985
to 55% in 1990, while the share of the public sector declined from 66%
in 1985 to 45% in 1990 (Figure 4.3). Thus the relative increase in the
share of the private sector in gross fixed capital formation can be
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attributed to the absolute decline in the public sector’s gross fixed
capital formation. This trend is compatible with the stylist facts of
transition countries where investment falls more than GDP, and thus
investment rates decline (Compos and Coricelli 2002, pp. 803).     
Figure 4.3 Gross Fixed Capital Formation in Syria (1985-1990)
 (% of GDP)
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Structural changes in the Syrian economy
Examining the sectoral changes in GDP throughout the period (1985-
1990), we note that the share of agriculture, although volatile from a
year to year basis, remained constant at around 20% of GDP. While the
share of industry dropped from 22% in 1985 to 20% in 1986, and
afterwards increased dramatically to reach 32% of GDP in 1990. On the
other hand, the share of services declined dramatically from 57% of
GDP in 1985 to 48% of GDP in 1990 (Table 4.1).   
These changes come in contrast with the structural changes that
usually occur in transition where the economy witnesses a process of de-
industrialization and a boom in the suppressed services sector (Compos
and Coricelli 2002, pp. 812). These changes even contrast with the
experience of Vietnam which also witnessed a decrease in its share of
industry and an increase in its share of services at a similar stage of
transition (Van Arkadie and Dinh 2004, pp. 25).
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Source: Central Bureau of Statistics (1993)
By disaggregating the services sector (table 4.2), it can be noted
that only the transportation and communications sub-sector and the
negligible private non-profit services sector had positive effects on the
share of services in GDP, while the four other sub-sectors (trade, finance
and insurance, social services and government services) all had negative
effects on its share. The biggest two sub-sectors in 1985, trade (22.2%)
and government services (17.3%), had the highest share of decline of
4.32%, 3.83% of GDP respectively, by the end of 1990, with their
contribution to the decline in the services sector being the largest at 47%
and 41.6% respectively. Changes in the share of trade, for the period
1985-1990, were volatile and did not follow a clear trend, and its share
only decreased significantly below its 1985 level in 1990 (these changes
will be left unexplained here). The decline in the share of government
services, which reached its lowest level in 1988 to 12% of GDP and
increased slightly afterwards can be attributed to cuts in public
expenditure. And by adding the decline in social services, a sector
highly financed by the public sector, social and government services
contributed to more than half of the decline in the share of the services
in GDP. Therefore, the decline in the share of services in GDP can, to a
large extent, be attributed to fiscal austerity and the contraction of the
government’s social responsibilities that took place during the period
(1986-1990).
Table 4.1 Structure of Syrian GDP 1985-1990
(In constant prices of 1985)
Agriculture Industry Services
1985
21 22 57
1986 23 20 56
1987 20 21 59
1988 23 24 53
1989
18 30 52
1990 20 32 48
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Table 4.2 The Composition of the Services Sector (% of GDP)
Year Trade Transportation
communication
Finance
insurance
Social
services
Government
services
Private
non profit
services
1985 22.2 9.8 5.0 2.6 17.3 0.07
1986 19.8 10.5 5.8 2.5 17.3 0.08
1987 27.2 11.0 4.9 1.9 14.1 0.08
1988 25.4 10.0 4.4 1.5 12.1 0.08
1989 20.6 11.1 4.3 1.4 14.5 0.10
1990 17.9 10.5 4.4 1.5 13.5 0.09
Overall
Change -4.3 0.7 -0.6 -1.2 -3.8 0.02
Contribu-
tion to the
decline in
the services
sector
47.0 -7.6 6.3 12.7 41.6 -0.2
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics (1993)
Thus, while other transition countries witnessed a process of de-
industrialization during its early years reflecting the degree of over-
industrialization during central planning, Syria witnessed a process that
could be referred to as ‘de-servicification’ also reflecting the over-
ambitious state formation, in comparison with its level of development,
which took place during the 70s. On the other hand, disaggregating
industry is more problematic as mining and manufacturing are
categorized in one sub sector and construction in another. Therefore,
changes in manufacturing cannot be analyzed separately from changes
in mining at the GDP level. However, data on mining and manufacturing
are available separately at the NDP level at factor cost in current prices.
At the GDP level, mining and manufacturing increased by 14.5 GDP
percentage points during the period (1985-1990), while the share of
building and construction decreased dramatically from 6.8% to 2.5% of
GDP for the same period, due to the downsizing of the public
construction companies  (Perthes 1992: 44).   At the NDP level, mining
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Table 4.3 The Composition of Industry
(% of GDP at market prices
in constant prices of 1985)
(% of NDP at factor cost in current prices)
Year Mining &
manufacturing
Building Mining Manufacturing Mining &
manufacturing
1985 15.0 6.8 6.9 6.3 13.1
1986 13.7 6.8 2.9 11.2 14.1
1987 17.3 3.7 7.5 5.9 13.5
1988 20.6 2.9 8.4 6.7 15.0
1989 27.5 2.7 12.8 8.9 21.7
1990 29.5 2.5 15.7 8.0 23.7
Overall
Change
14.5 -4.3 8.8 1.7 10.6
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Various Editions
increased by 8.8 NDP percentage points while manufacturing increased
by 1.7 NDP percentage points for the overall period. The highest share
of increase in mining happened in the last two years (1989-1990), due to
the hike in oil prices. And this sharp increase coincided with an increase
in the share of manufacturing due to the implementation of the barter
deal with the Soviet Union which encouraged manufacturing exports,
explaining the dramatic increase in the share of industry towards the end
of the period.
Trade
By examining figure 4.4, we note that imports declined from 22.6% of
GDP to 17.2%, during the period (1985-1990), with the highest share of
decline taking place in 1986 reflecting the foreign exchange crisis.
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Figure 4.4 Syria's Foreign Trade (1985-1990)
(%of GDP)  
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Exports increased from less than 10% of GDP in 1985 to around
30%. The hike in exports in 1989, obvious in the graph, reflects both an
increase of around 12 GDP percentage points in non oil exports and 5
GDP percentage points in oil exports. The increase in oil exports is
explained mainly by the rise in oil prices, while the increase in non oil
exports could be explained by the export promotion strategy adopted by
the government in order to acquire foreign currency, the barter deal with
the Soviet Union for debt clearing, and partly by the development of
‘fictive’ exports with the aim of gaining legal access to foreign exchange,
Figure 4.5 Distribution of Syria's Exports by Economic Activity 
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although it is difficult to disentangle these effects. It was manufacturing
rather than mining that represented the highest share of exports (ranging
between 55-65% of exports) although this might be misleading due to
the development of fictive exports, as mentioned before.  The increased
opening of foreign trade to the private sector, and the encouragement of
the private sector to participate in the Soviet barter deal led to significant
increases in the contribution of the private sector to foreign trade.  Thus,
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while the share of the private sector in overall exports was merely 8%
and 16% in overall imports in 1985, its share, in 1990, increased to 45%
and 46% respectively. Furthermore, by 1990, the private sector had the
dominat role in exports agricultural (77%) and manufacturing (68%)
exports (Although, as mentioned before, these figures are likely to
overestimate private exports due to ‘fictive’ export and underestimate
private imports as smuggling is not taken into account) (See table 4.4).    
Table 4.4 The Share of the Private and Public Sectors in Foreign Trade
Agricultural exports Manufacturing exports Total exports
Year Public Private Public Private public Private
1985 73 27 86 14 92 8
1990 23 77 32 68 55 45
Agricultural imports Manufacturing imports Total imports
Year Public Private Public Private public Private
1985 94 6 77 23 84 16
1990 55 45 53 47 54 46
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Various Editions
Macroeconomic Stabilization
Overall, Syria was successful in achieving macroeconomic stabilization.
The austerity measures and cuts in public spending assisted in reducing
the budget deficit from 21% in 1984 to 3% in 1988. The combination of
austerity level imports and increasing oil and non-oil exports led to a
positive balance of payments surplus in 1989, or at least an ostensible
balance of payments surplus. The first three years of reform (1986-1988)
witnessed an increase in annual inflation above its average level (15%),
due to the devaluation of the Syrian currency, the reduction of price
subsidies and increasing shortages, which peaked at 53.2% in 1987. By
1989, inflation had been reduced significantly to 17%. The lowering of
public spending and, consequently, the reduction in the fiscal deficit, the
transferring of government borrowing from the Central Bank to the
commercial banks and the increase in oil exports all contributed to
reduction of inflation rates (figure 4.6). In comparison to other transition
countries, the maximum annual inflation that Syria reached was
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relatively low, only higher than the rates of China, Hungry and the
Czech Republic. Even if true inflation levels were higher than the levels
reported – assuming actual inflation rates to be double that reported
–Syria still did not experience the hyperinflation of other transition
countries.
Figure 4.6 Syria's Annual Inflation Rates
(%) (1984-1991)
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Figure 4.7 Highest Annual Inflation Rates, Transition Countries   
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Growth in Transition and Syria’s Austerity Years
The initial low level of development and relatively high macroeconomic
distortions in Syria led to the adoption of gradual and selective
liberalization measures as predicted by the transition model, with
liberalization confined to price liberalization, especially in agriculture,
and increasing openness to the private sector in both investment and
foreign trade; this resembles the dual track approach of Asian transition
countries. Unlike Asian transition economies, however, Syria’s
favorable initial conditions (its low level of development and its strong
market memory) were offset by the initial high levels of macroeconomic
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distortions (fiscal and balance of payments imbalances, high trade
dependency and integration with the CMEA), increasing the predicted
intensity of Syria’s transitory shock.  On the other hand, the existence of
the Socialist bloc and the Soviet Union, at the time of reform, mitigated
the adverse impact of a trade shock (especially with the export boom in
manufacturing products to the Soviet Union 1988-1990 as a method of
debt repayment). Furthermore, by taking the oil boom into account - or
say, the increase in Syria’s richness in natural resources - in addition to
its gradual liberalization measures, it becomes clear why Syria’s initial
output decline was trivial in comparison with other transition countries.
Therefore, the non-conventional W curve that characterized Syria’s
transitional output path could be explained, in addition to the factors
mentioned above, by the volatility of the agricultural sector which was
vulnerable to climate factors and undergoing a process of liberalization.
Overall, recovery was achieved mainly through growth in oil exports
rather than by the reallocation & restructuring mechanisms--that are
stimulated through liberalization measures—necessary to recover from
transformational recession.  While Syria’s investment ratio declined, in
congruence with the stylized facts of transition countries, Syria’s GDP
structure did not change along the lines of other transition countries,
indicating the special characteristics of Syria’s central planning years.   
The Nineties: Economic Pluralism
The end of the Gulf war initiated a new phase in the Syrian economy
that lasted throughout the 1990s. The oil boom and the take off of the
private sector could be regarded as the pillars of this new phase.   The
accumulated liberalization measures since the beginning of reform up to
investment Law No.10 of 1991 stimulated the private sector; at the same
time oil windfalls helped in sustaining the loss-making public sector and
funded necessary infrastructure projects. This situation was denoted by
the term “economic pluralism” which envisaged economic development
through the encouragement of the public, mixed and private sectors.
Syrian manufacturing, after losing its soft export markets, due to
the collapse of the Soviet block, became more oriented towards the
domestic market. This tendency was facilitated by the new oil windfalls
which provided necessary foreign exchange to import capital goods
without facing a severe balance of payments deficit. Thus, the first half
of the nineties witnessed the establishment of a manufacturing pattern
that could be characterized as private-led, concentrating on consumer
products and domestic-oriented. This pattern of industrialization was
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fortified by the oil windfalls and the trade restrictiveness of the Syrian
trade regime. The initial success of this pattern diminished the incentive
for further reforms, decreased the urge for competing in the international
market and diminished the incentive for promoting manufacturing
exports. Furthermore, the dynamics of this pattern of industrialization
necessitated domestic market protection, thus, maintaining international
trade restrictiveness. Thus, except for Investment Law No. 10 of 1991
liberalization was limited to the continuation of liberalization of the
agricultural sector that was initiated in the late eighties.
Moving along to the macroeconomic stabilization policies that
were pursued during the 90s, it should be noted that oil revenues assisted
in financing the budget and stabilizing the exchange rate, and brought to
a halt the decreasing trend in public expenditure that occurred during the
austerity years. On the other hand, the fixed nominal interest rates
immobilized monetary policy, leaving fiscal policy responsibility for
price and exchange rate stability instead of concentrating on its role of
influencing aggregate demand. Therefore, achieving budget equilibrium
was of major concern. And taking into account the generous tax
exemptions given to long term investment such as in Law No. 10 of
1991, achieving budget equilibrium necessitated maintenance of a still
relatively contractionary expenditure policy which in turn had negative
effects on aggregate demand. Thus, although Syria’s inflation and fiscal
position remained at manageable levels, this was achieved at the
expense of stimulating aggregate demand (Economic Research Forum
2006, pp. 26).   
The combination of deflationary fiscal policy and the absence of a
second wave of reforms led to lower growth rates in the second half of
the 90s. Thus, while the first half of the decade (1991-95) witnessed an
average annual growth rate of 8.2%, the average annual growth rate of
the second half of the decade (1996-2000) declined to 3.9%, and
plummeting to -3.6% in 1999 (Central Bureau of Statistics, Various
Editions). Moreover, the rise and fall of the private sector in Syria
during the 90s is quite evident in the inverse ‘U’ shapes that
characterized the trends of many variables. Private fixed capital
formation (figure 5.1) increased from 10% of GDP in 1990 to 17% in
1994, only to decline again to 7.6% in 1999 (Central Bureau of
Statistics, Various Editions). The same trend, the inverse ‘U’ curve,
applies to private sector imports of capital goods during the 90s (figure
5.2). The share of manufacturing in GDP also increased during the first
half of the decade to reach 13% in 1996, and declined in the second half
to 4% of GDP in 2000 (Abu Ismail et al 2002, pp. 85).
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Figure 5.1 Syria's Private Gross Fixed Capital Formation 
(1989-1999) (%of GDP)
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Figure 5.2 Syria's Private Sector Imports of Capital 
Goods (1990-1999) (in Millions of US$) 
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The absence of institutional and financial reforms made the cost of
doing business in Syria exceptionally high and unpredictable. The
private sector had limited access to finance and most firms relied on
internal and family-based financing (World Bank 2005, pp. 39-40). The
financial sector seemed weak and unable to allocate resources towards
sectors in need. The highest percentage of loans was directed towards
agriculture and distribution of agricultural products while manufacturing
only captured a small fraction of overall loans (Table 5.1). Moreover,
the over-regulated labor market, the high levels of informal payments,
the unpredictable tax burden and inadequate infrastructure (electricity
shortages-weak telecommunications infrastructure) all contributed to
raising the cost and the unpredictability of doing business in Syria
(World Bank, 2005). Furthermore, the weak protection of property
rights, and the absence of marketing infrastructure hindered investing in
research and innovation and targeting of export markets (World Bank,
2005).
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Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Various Editions
The absence of institutional and financial reforms deterred the
natural expansion of the private sector which became locked in small
enterprises (Hinnebusch 1995: 317). And although Investment Law
No.10, with all its tax holidays, aimed at attracting local and foreign
capital towards large scale manufacturing, the greatest bulk of
investment concentrated on oil and services. Overall, the private sector
was incapable of generating enough jobs to absorb excess labor, at a
time when the public sector had reduced its responsibility as the major
employment generator, leading to increasing unemployment and
poverty. The long period of isolation from open markets had left Syria’s
industrial structure with enormous competitive gaps. By the end of the
decade, “Syria suffered a technological downgrading of its production
and exports structures,” with the share of sophisticated products (high
and medium technology) in Manufacturing Value Added falling from
10.5% in 1990 to 9.3% in 2000. The share of technological downgrading
of manufactured exports was more even obvious, with the share of high
and medium technology products in manufacturing exports plummeting
from 28% in 1990 to 1% in 2000 (Albaladejo and Lull 2004, pp. 5-6).
Table 5.1 Allocation of Domestic Credit by Economic Sector: 1990-2000
Agriculture Wholesale and
Distribution9
Industry and
Mining
Construction Services Misc. Total
1990 11% 73% 7% 6% 0% 2% 100%
1991 12% 72% 6% 7% 0% 2% 100%
1992 12% 72% 5% 7% 0% 3% 100%
1993 11% 70% 10% 7% 0% 2% 100%
1994 11% 73% 3% 9% 1% 3% 100%
1995 11% 71% 2% 9% 4% 3% 100%
1996 10% 71% 2% 10% 4% 3% 100%
1997 10% 71% 2% 10% 4% 3% 100%
1998 10% 70% 2% 10% 4% 3% 100%
1999 10% 72% 2% 10% 1% 6% 100%
2000 10% 72% 2% 9% 1% 6% 100%
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Figure 5.3 Syria's Actual Public Expenditure 
(1990-2000) (% of GDP) 
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On the other hand, the deflationary fiscal policy pursued by the
government with the aim of achieving price and exchange rate stability
led to a decline in actual public expenditure in the second half of the
90s, after peaking in 1994, at a time when fiscal stimulus was highly
required (figure 5.3). Moreover, the fixed nominal interest rates at 8%
played an important role in stimulating investment up to 1995 when
inflation rates far exceeded interest rates, whereas after 1995, with the
decline in inflation rates, fixed nominal interest rates hampered
investments and contributed to the lower growth rates of the second half
of the 90s (Kanaan, 2002). It must be noted that, within the framework
above, exogenous factors which the Syrian economy is highly
influenced by (rain-fed agriculture-oil-remittances) played either the role
of cushioning (good harvest in 1998) or exposing (bad harvest - decline
in oil revenues in 1999) the structural weaknesses in the Syrian economy
during the second half of the decade.    
Syria’s boom in the early 90s can be attributed to the stabilization
and liberalization measures taken in the late 1980s, thus confirming
some of the most common consensuses in transition literature. One is
that stabilization acts as a pre-condition for growth (Havrylyshyn 2001,
pp. 68) and that it is through accumulated liberalization, given a time
lag, that liberalization has a positive effect on growth (de Melo et al,
1997). Syria’s boom in the early 90s also confirms the view that
stimulating growth in the early stage of transition can be easily achieved
by liberalization and stabilization. However, in the long run, institutional
reform plays the decisive role in sustaining growth in transition.
(Haverylyshyn and van Rooden 2000).
Moreover, Syria’s experience confirms that the role of favorable
initial conditions diminishes over time and growth cannot be sustained
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unless further liberalization measures are taken (de Melo et al 1997, pp.
35-37). On the other hand, Syria’s success at achieving macro economic
stabilization during the nineties was achieved at the expense of growth
due to the peculiarity of Syria’s fiscal and monetary policies, or say, the
pre-maturity of Syria’s fiscal and monetary policies. The experience of
stabilization hampering growth in Syria comes in deep contrast with the
positive role for it predicted in transition studies.
The anticipated trade shock associated with collapse of the Soviet
bloc and the breakdown of the CMEA system was not materialized due
to the increased oil exports to European countries.  Thus, while exports
to the former socialist countries plummeted to less than 10% of overall
exports in 1992, exports to European countries soared to more than 60%
(figure 5.4).
By comparing Syria’s pattern of transition with other comparable
low income transition countries such as Asian transition countries
(Vietnam and China), it is noted that although both Syria and Asian
countries adopted a gradual dual track approach to transition, there were
many differences between the two experiences: whereas Syria isolated
itself from the international market and concentrated on the domestic
market, Vietnam and China, benefiting from their regional locations,
sought to integrate their economies with the global market and follow an
export led strategy. Although both Syria and Asian countries initiated
economic reform without political change, political power in Asian
countries was decentralized to local levels. Nothing similar to that has
taken place in Syria. Vietnam and China have also been more successful
in reforming their SOEs through imposing hard budget constraints,
increasing enterprise autonomy and introducing profit based practices,
whereas attempts to reform the public sector in Syria, such as
‘management by objectives’ and Law No. 20 of 1994, have scarcely
been implemented. As a result, while the public sector contributed
positively to output and investment in Asian countries, the Syrian public
sector did not.    
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Figure 5.4 Syria's Exports by International Blocks (1989-1999)
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Finally, both China and Vietnam underwent significant structural
transformation with an increase in the share of industry and services in
their GDP. On the other hand, Syria scarcely witnessed any structural
change during the nineties with only a slight increase in the share of rent
seeking activities such as mining and agriculture.  However, a similarity
that can be drawn between the two experiences is that the limited
financial liberalization in Asian countries, and its absence in Syria, have
limited the SMEs access to credit and, therefore, hampered their growth
and made them unable to create enough jobs and, in turn, exacerbated
the unemployment and poverty problem. On the other hand, the
performance of the Syrian economy in the 90s is similar, in many ways,
to that of other resource abundant transition economies such as
Uzbekistan. With the exports of natural resources maintaining the
balance of payments, both countries implemented import substitution
strategies, protected their domestic markets, achieved rapid recovery and
delayed reforms, especially in financial and foreign trade liberalization.
As a result, the growth collapse predicted for Uzbekistan (Auty 1999)
was actually materialised in Syria.
On the whole, however, Syria’s GDP path during transition (1986 -
1999) was quite positive in comparison with other transition countries,
highly superior to both the averages of FSU and CEE countries and
slightly lower than the path of Vietnam. Even when comparing with
countries with the lowest cumulative output decline such as Poland,
Slovak and Slovenia, Syria’s GDP path was also considerably better.               
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Figure 5.5 GDP Path in Transition Time
 (pre-transition year = 100)
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Figure 5.6 GDP Path of Transition Countries with Lowest 
Cumulative Output Decline
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2000-present: The Resumption of Reform
Reform Policy
Although it is too early to determine the final outcome of current reform
as the process is still ongoing, it is still possible to sketch out their
impact. By the beginning of the millennium, Syria was haunted by the
mid-term outlook of declining oil prices anticipating the threat of an
upcoming fiscal and balance of payments shocks.  Consequently, Syria
was facing two challenges: 1) achieving fiscal sustainability, and 2)
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diversifying the production and export base (International Monetary
Fund 2005a, pp. 4).  And just as the oil boom and high growth rates in
the early 90s diminished the urgency of reform, the depleting oil
reserves and the low growth rates in the late 90s encouraged the
resumption of economic reform.
The year 2000 witnessed the announcement of economic reforms;
however, these reforms lacked a clear strategy (Economic Research
Forum 2006, pp. 35). Decree No.7 of 2000 and the amendment of Law
No. 10 of 1991, could be viewed as incorporating the legal property
rights (the rule of law) dimension to the investment climate.10  The year
2001 witnessed the deregulation of the long time blocked real estate
market by canceling old fixed rent contracts and sharing the value
between owner and tenants. Most importantly, financial reform was
initiated in the early 2000s by creating the necessary regulatory and
supervisory framework for financial liberalization through setting up a
Credit and Monetary Council with the task of designing monetary policy
and regulating the licensing and registration procedures of banks and the
confidentiality of the profession. And in 2004, private banks began to
operate.
In the second half of the decade, private insurance companies,
Islamic banks and foreign exchange bureaus and companies were
allowed to operate. Moreover, the second half of the decade witnessed
the creation of the Securities and Financial Markets authorities (Law No
22 of 2005) with the task of launching a stock exchange. The Damascus
Securities Exchange (DSE) was established in 2006  (Decree No 55 of
2006) but was still has not operating in the spring of 2008.
As achieving fiscal sustainability became of major concern with
depleting oil reserves, it was necessary to seek adjustments on both the
revenue and the expenditure side of the budget. On the revenue side, a
new Income Tax Law (Law No. 24) was passed in 2003 aiming at
reducing tax evasion through lowering tax brackets and imposing severe
penalties on tax evaders (Law for Combating Tax Evasion: Law No. 25)
while widening the tax base by bringing in new activities not previously
taxed.  Moreover, a general consumption tax law was passed in 2004
replacing a large number of indirect taxes and acting as a transitional
step before the adoption of VAT, representing a shift in Syria’s tax
policy towards indirect taxes. On the expenditure side, the Government
pursued a policy of gradual reduction in subsidies which is most evident
in the substantial decrease in the expenditure of the Price Stabilization
Fund throughout the period (2000-2005) from 3.7% to 2% of GDP.
Furthermore, there have been increases in the prices of petroleum
products (diesel and gasoline)
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Foreign trade and the exchange rate  experienced considerable
liberalization measures too. The maximum tariff rate has been lowered
from 255 to 65% (IMF 2006, pp. 37) while the average tariff rate has
been lowered from 20 percent in 2003 to 14.5 % in 2006 (IMF 2007, pp.
22). Important steps have been taken towards removing quantitative
restrictions through tariffication, while positive lists of importable goods
have been replaced with a negative list. And with the number of official
exchange rates being reduced and their level adjusted, there has been a
steady progress toward exchange rate unification. Moreover, Syria
embarked on signing free trade agreements, most notably was GAFTA
coming into force.   
There has been a shift in fiscal policy from deflationary to
expansionary, with an increase in the size of the government in order to
compensate for the private sector’s drawing back from investment
during the second half of the 90s. This shift in fiscal policy represents a
breakaway from budgetary discipline towards adopting a counter
cyclical Keynesian policy.  And for the first time since 1981, interest
rates were lowered in 2003 and credit policy was eased by raising the
ceiling on single loans and relaxing the collateral requirements.
The current wave of reforms has been much more comprehensive
in comparison with the reforms undertaken in 1986-1991. And while the
reforms of 1986-1991 had a much more tentative nature and were much
more concerned with resolving the crisis in the economy through
reducing public expenditure and seeking a private sector alternative,
current reforms have shown a clear trend of shifting towards a market
economy especially with the adoption of the social market economy in
the 10th Five Year Plan. On the other hand, both waves of reforms have
been selective. And while the reforms of 1986-1991 where confined to
increasing openess to the private sector and price liberalization, the
current wave of reforms has added trade and financial liberaization to its
agenda. However, neither substantially targeted the reconstructing and
privatization of the public sector or the broader issues of institutional
reform.       
Performance
The period 2000-2002 can be viewed as a continuation of the same
framework that explains performance in the 90s.  As in the late 90s,
Syria’s economy was influenced by the combination of a deflationary
fiscal policy, overvalued real interest rates, and the absence of a second
wave of reforms. Additionally, oil reserves were depleting and oil
exports were declining and it was too early for contemporary reforms to
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have a significant positive effect on growth.  Thus, Syria, at the outset of
the new millennium, was trapped in a low growth situation. However,
this low growth situation was cushioned by two external factors: a good
harvest in 2001 and 2002, and a special trade agreement (2002-2003)
with Iraq before the invasion, “similar to the one made with the former
Soviet Union in 1989-1990, before its collapse” (Economic Research
Forum 2006, pp. 35). This resulted in reasonable growth rates of (3.6%,
4.1%), and high non-oil growth rates of (7.6%, 7.5%) for the years 2001,
2002 respectively (Table 6.1).   
Table 6.1 GDP Growth Rates 2000-2003
 2000 2001 2002 2003
 Real GDP growth rate 0.6 3.6 4.1 1.1
 Real non-oil GDP growth
rate
1.6 7.6 7.5 2.5
Source: International Monetary Fund (2005b)
The year 2003 was gloomy with all external factors - declining oil
exports, a bad harvest and regional conflict (the invasion of Iraq) – being
negative and contributing to an economic slowdown. However, the
expansionary fiscal and monetary policies adopted had the effect of
cushioning the negative impacts of the above mentioned external factors
(International Monetary Fund 2005a, pp. 10) and the year 2003 had a
modest growth rate of 1.1%.
From 2004 onwards, Syria recovered benefiting from private
exports and private investment due to excess liquidity in the Gulf
Region, the implementation of GAFTA, increase in aggregate demand -
due to the influx of Iraqi refugees - and an improved business climate
(International Monetary Fund 2006, International Monetary Fund 2007).
Moreover, the real estate boom associated with the influx of Iraqi
refugees and its associated wealth effect, in addition to credit growth,
public wage increases and good harvests all contributed to boosting
consumption, and growth rates, albeit at the cost of increasing inflation
and fiscal deficit (Table 6.2). By 2005, Syria’s gross fixed capital
formation began to restore its early 90s levels reaching approximately
25% of GDP (figure 6.1). While prior to 2004 the public sector was the
main contributor to investment growth, from 2004 onwards the private
sector increased its investment rates, exceeding that of the public sector.
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Table 6.2 GDP Growth Rates 2004-2007
 
2004 2005 2006 2007
 Real GDP  growth rate
2.8 3.3 4.4 3.9
 Real non-oil GDP growth
rate 5 6 6.5 5.8
Source: International Monetary Fund (2007)
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With a decrease in oil exports and an increase in manufacturing
exports (figure 6.3), trade has been gradually shifting from European
countries to Arab countries; although it is still early to tell whether the
increase in exports to Arab countries is a sustainable trend or just a
temporary phenomenon (figure 6.2).    
    
Figure 6.2 Destination of Syrian Exports (2000-2006) 
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Figure 6.3 Distribution of Exports by Economic Activity 
(2000-2006) (%of total exports)
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Figure 6.4 Credit to Public and Private Sectors (2000-2005)
 (% of GDP)
0
5
10
15
20
25
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
  Credit to private sector 
  Credit to public sector 
Source: International Monetary Fund (2005b and 2007
Furthermore, there have been positive signs regarding financial
intermediation with the increase in private sector’s access to credit
surpassing the level of the public sector in 2005 (figure 6.4), and a slight
increase in the share of credit allocated to industry and construction
(Table 6.3).    
Table 6.3 Allocation of Credit to Different Sectors (2000-2005)
Agriculture Wholesale
and Distribu-
tion
Industry
and
Mining
Construction Services Misc.
2000 10 72 2 9 1 6
2001 18 62 3 10 0 7
2002 25 51 4 12 0 8
2003 29 44 7 12 0 9
2004 24 41 8 15 0 12
2005 19 39 7 15 0 19
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Various Editions
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Further Reform: Obstacles and Threats
Moving on with reform will be more difficult and the absence of reform
in public administration threatens the effectiveness of the
implementation of the reform process. The International Monetary Fund
(2007) argues that the lack of technical expertise will make it hard to
effectively implement legislation adopted in recent years. Moreover,
weaknesses in data will impede the ability to monitor the impact of
reforms and the capability of conducting macroeconomic management.
While the absence of restructuring public enterprises will continue “to
drain resources and hinder the growth of the private sector”
(International Monetary Fund 2005a, pp. 8)   The slow progress in state
banks’ restructuring - which are undercapitalized and suffer from high
non-performing loans and low profitability – may entice these banks to
obstruct further reforms in the banking sector thwarting the development
of the competitiveness of the sector (International Monetary Fund  2007,
pp. 21-22). Furthermore, there are many weaknesses in the regulatory
and supervisory capacity of the banking sector, with the limited
capability of evaluating the adequacy of banks’ internal controls and
their risk management practices. This is alarming in view of the recent
credit expansion by private banks  (International Monetary Fund  2007,
pp. 22).    
Overall, there is a need for restructuring the Central Bank so that it
becomes an independent Central Bank with full supervisory authority
over all banking institutions, declares price stability as the main
objective of monetary policy, and develops monetary instruments for
conducting monetary policy (e.g. liberalizing interest rates, issuing
treasury bonds) and thus clearing the room for fiscal policy to influence
aggregate demand.
Moving to the issue of fiscal sustainability and the need for
adjustment on both sides of the budget, on the revenue side it is noted
that although the ending of all tax exemptions offered under investment
Law No. 10 of 1991 (Decree No 8 of 2007) can be viewed as an attempt
towards broadening the tax base and rationalizing tax exemption,
administrative capacity is still weak in mitigating tax evasion and
implementing a comprehensive VAT. From the expenditure side, past
oil revenues increased the amount of waste and decreased the
effectiveness in both current and development expenditure; at present,
neither expenditures are prioritized, nor are projects included in the
budget preceded by feasibility studies (Economic Research Forum 2006,
pp. 29). In view of the flaws on both sides of the budget, the mid-term
aspect of the fiscal stance is quite worrisome. In particular, it questions
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the practicality of creating a ‘social market economy’ as mentioned in
the 10th FYP through allocating additional resources to creating safety
nets and tackling unemployment.     
Figure 6.4 The Cost of Doing Business,Transition Countries
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Finally, implementing institutional reforms aiming at strengthening
competition, good governance, property rights, and the rule of law has
been quite sluggish, and consequently, the cost of doing business has
been high. According to the World Bank Group Doing Business Project
index (figure 6.4), Syria is ranked 137 out of 178 countries and is among
the highest in comparison with other transition countries along with
other slow reformers (Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Belarus etc…). The absence
of institutional reforms may induce the creation of oligopolies amid the
liberalization of the economy.
Conclusion
Despite the structural differences between Syria and other transition
countries as evident in the analysis of its initial conditions, Syria’s
economic performance can still be explained quite well by using an
analytical framework of a transition economy. Syria’s initial conditions,
characterized by a low level of development and moderately high
macroeconomic distortions, explain quite well its adoption of a gradual
transition path. And although its level of macroeconomic distortions
would have predicted a more severe initial output decline, the boom in
oil exports, the assistance of the Soviet bloc and Syria’s high market
memory helped to mitigate these adverse shocks. The result was an
output path akin to a shallow W shape curve holding a middle ground
between the conventional U shape curve of CEE and FSU countries and
the continuous high growth rates of Asian countries. Moreover, Syria’s
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initial structural change comes in contrast with the experience of other
transition countries with a fall in the share of its services sector instead
of its industry sector reflecting the special characteristics of Syria’s
central planning years as a rentier state overdeveloped in comparison
with its poor productive base.        
Syria’s transition experience is similar to the Asian transition
countries of Vietnam and China in adopting a gradual dual track
approach. However, Vietnam and China have been more successful in
decentralising political power, revitalizating the public sector and
aligning their economies with the global market. The boom in Syria’s oil
exports has diminished the inventives of taking such measures. This is a
situation quite similar to the experience of other resource abundant
transition economies where recovery was fast, reforms were delayed and
the economy locked in a staple trap.
With oil exports declining and a fiscal and balance of payments
crisis being anticipated, Syria has unleashed another wave of reforms.
So far, Syria’s growth rates are satisfactory and its  fiscal and balance of
payments deficits are still at manageable levels owing to the increase in
oil prices and the increase in trade with Arab countries. However, the
future is less certain, especially as low administrative capacity may
hinder the successful implementation of further reforms. Moreover, the
absence of broader institutional reforms may result in a non-competitive
market economy with burgeoning oligarchies as the experience of
“Former Soviet Union Countries” suggests.    
                                                      
1 Staple trap refers to the outcome of a policy of transferring resource rents
from potentially efficient sectors to less efficient activities, and thus leading to
sustaining output in the short and medium run at the expense of adverse
consequences in the long run.
2 The transitory shock refers to the initial decline in the output of transition
countries which is considered a necessary outcome of the introduction of hard
budget constraints and the shift from a seller’s to a buyer’s market.     
3 The liberalization index (LI) was constructed originally by de Melo et al
(1996). The index ranges from 0 to 1, and is calculated annually for each
country based on a weighted average of three components: 1) Liberalizing
internal markets (LII) (30%)--price liberalization, de-monopolization; 2)
Liberalizing external markets (LIE) (30%)--reducing quantitative restrictions
and tariffs; 3) Facilitating private sector entry (LIP) (40%)--privatization,
private sector share, financial sector liberalization.
4 The main difference between the de Melo et al (1997) transition model
and other transition models lies in that the former includes a more
comprehensive set of initial conditions in its analysis and extends the set of the
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transition countries to include Vietnam and China. Another important aspect is
that inflation, a measure of stabilization, is used – along with GDP growth – as
the dependent variable, whereas inflation is usually the explanatory variable.                 
5 It is acknowledged that the valuation of output represents a major
measurement problem for all transition countries. However, most transition
studies content themselves with official GDP figures due to the difficulty of
finding consistent estimates of unofficial economy for the sample of countries
over an extended period, (Havrylyshyn 2001, pp. 75). This study, in line with
other transition studies will also rely on official data, while acknowledging that
this will negatively affect the robustness of the conclusions drawn.    
6 The initial year of transition is different among different countries. For
CEE, Mongolia and the FSU the initial year corresponds with the political
changes that occurred in 1989-90 and 1991 respectively. Whereas for China, the
initial year is defined with the shift to a more market-oriented economic policy
in 1978; while 1986 is the initial year for both Vietnam and Syria corresponding
with Vietnam’s launching of the ‘doi moi’ reform program and Syria’s foreign
exchange crisis.
7 de Melo et al (1997) rely on the ‘repressed inflation’ indicator. However,
this indicator was not used for measuring macro distortions due to the difficulty
in estimating repressed inflation in the early eighties in Syria. However, it is
safe to assume that Syria was suffering from serious macroeconomic
imbalances.
8 ‘Fictive exports’ or ‘fantasy exportation’ refers to products that are
exported across the border but not necessarily marketed abroad with the aim of
obtaining an export document from Syrian customs in order to prove legal
access to foreign exchange (Perthes 1992, pp. 47).   
9 The category ‘Wholesale and Distribution’ comprises mainly credit
allocated for the procurement of cotton and wheat and other agricultural
products   
10  The new decree established stronger legal protection for investors such
as giving them the right of appeal before the Arab Investment Court or any other
international jurisdiction arising from agreements signed between Syria and the
country of the investor, and offering assurance to private investment that private
assets cannot be expropriated or nationalized (Abu-Ismail et al 2002, pp. 84).   
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